





Macroeconomic Crises since 1870
ABSTRACT We build on Angus Maddison’s data by assembling inter-
national time series from before 1914 on real per capita personal consumer
expenditure, C, and by improving the GDP data. We have full annual data on
C for twenty-four countries and GDP for thirty-six. For samples starting at
1870, we apply a peak-to-trough method to isolate economic crises, deﬁned as
cumulative declines in C or GDP of at least 10 percent. We ﬁnd 95 crises for C
and 152 for GDP, implying disaster probabilities of 3
1⁄2 percent a year, with
mean size of 21–22 percent and average duration of 3
1⁄2 years. Simulation of a
Lucas-tree model with i.i.d. shocks and Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences accords
with the observed average equity premium of around 7 percent on levered
equity, using a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion of 3.5. This result is robust
to several perturbations, except for limiting the sample to nonwar crises.
A
n earlier study by Barro used Thomas Rietz’s insight on rare eco-
nomic disasters to explain the equity premium puzzle introduced by
Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott.
1 Key parameters were the probability
p of disaster and the distribution of disaster sizes b. Because large macro-
economic disasters are rare, pinning down p and the b distribution from
historical data requires long time series for many countries, along with the
assumption of rough parameter stability over time and across countries.
Barro’s 2006 study relied on long-term international GDP data for thirty-
ﬁve countries from Angus Maddison’s 2003 dataset.
2 Using the deﬁnition
of an economic disaster as a peak-to-trough fall in GDP per capita of at
least 15 percent, Barro found sixty disasters, corresponding to p = 1.7 per-
cent a year. The average disaster size was 29 percent, and the empirical
size distribution was used to calibrate a model of asset pricing.
1. Barro (2006); Rietz (1988); Mehra and Prescott (1985).
2. Maddison (2003).
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GDP. This distinction is especially important for wars. For example, in the
United Kingdom during the two world wars, GDP increased while con-
sumer expenditure fell sharply, the difference representing mostly added
military spending. Maddison’s 2003 dataset provides national accounts
information only for GDP. Our initial idea was to add consumption, which
we approximate by real personal consumer expenditure, C, because of dif-
ﬁculties in most cases in separating durable goods consumption from that
of nondurable goods and services. (We discuss later the breakdown of C
into durables versus nondurables for a subset of countries with available
data for crisis periods.) We have not assembled data on government con-
sumption, some of which may substitute for C and thereby affect asset
pricing. However, this substitution is probably unimportant for military
expenditure, which is the type of government spending that moves sharply
during some disaster events.
Maddison’s 2003 dataset, with updates available on the Internet at
www.ggdc.net/maddison, represents a monumental and widely used
resource for international studies using long-term GDP data. Although
much of the information is sound, close examination revealed many prob-
lems. For our purposes the most important shortcoming is that Maddison
tends to ﬁll in missing data with doubtful assumptions, and this practice
applies especially to major crises.
As examples of problems, Maddison assumed that Belgium’s GDP dur-
ing World Wars I and II moved in tandem with France’s; that Mexico’s
GDP between 1910 and 1919, the period including its revolution and
civil war, followed a smooth trend, with no crisis; that GDP for Colombia
moved over more than a decade with the average of Brazil and Chile; and
that GDP in Germany for the crucial years 1944–46 followed a linear
trend. There were also mismatches between originally cited works and
published series for GDP in Japan and Austria at the end of World War II,
in Greece during World War II and its civil war, and in South Korea during
World War II and the Korean War.
Given these and analogous problems, our project expanded to estimating
long-term GDP for many countries. The Maddison information was often
usable, but superior estimates or longer time series could often be con-
structed. In addition, results from recent major long-term national accounts
projects for several countries are now available and have not been incor-
porated into Maddison’s Internet updates. These studies cover Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Sweden, and Taiwan. Table A1 in appendix A
summarizes the key differences, by country and time period, between Mad-
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the Internet (www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro).
The ﬁrst section of the paper describes the long-term data that we have
assembled on real per capita personal consumer expenditure, C, and real
per capita GDP. Our main analysis uses annual data from before 1914 for
twenty-four countries on C and thirty-six countries on GDP. The second
section discusses the long-term data that we use on rates of return for
stocks, bills, and bonds. This information comes mostly from Global
Financial Data. The third section describes our measurement of C and
GDP crises, based primarily on peak-to-trough fractional declines during
the crises. The fourth section discusses the limited information available
on the breakdown of C into durables versus nondurables and services.
The ﬁfth section compares disaster sizes and timing based on C with
those based on GDP. The sixth section uses the crises data to measure
disaster probabilities and frequency distributions of disaster sizes. The
seventh section summarizes a representative-agent Lucas-tree model
that relates disaster experience to expected rates of return and the equity
premium. The eighth section simulates the Lucas-tree model using the
empirically estimated disaster probability and the frequency distribution of
disaster sizes. The simulated model with a reasonable coefﬁcient of rela-
tive risk aversion accords reasonably well with observed equity premia.
The ninth section modiﬁes the simulation to use observed real stock-price
changes to gauge crisis returns on stocks. We also discuss the low average
real bill returns observed during crises. The ﬁnal section concludes with
plans for additional research.
Long-Term Data on Personal Consumer Expenditure and GDP
We are dealing with national accounts data for forty-two countries. This
sample is the universe of countries that seem to be promising for con-
structing reasonably accurate annual data since before World War I. The
current study focuses on the countries for which we have thus far assem-
bled annual data from before 1914 to 2006 on C (twenty-four countries)
and GDP (thirty-six countries).
Table 1 shows a list of included countries and starting years. The top
panel applies to twenty-one “OECD countries” (not including Turkey or
recently acceding members); seventeen of these are in our C sample, and
all twenty-one are in our GDP sample. The bottom panel covers eighteen
“non-OECD” countries, of which seven are in our C sample, and ﬁfteen
are in our GDP sample. The three countries that we are studying that are
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11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 257Table 1. Starting Dates and Missing Values for Consumer Expenditure and GDPa
Starting dates Missing values
Country C GDP C GDP
OECD countriesb
Australia 1901 1820





















United Kingdom 1830 1830































Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at www.
economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. C represents real per capita personal consumer expenditure; GDP represents real per capita GDP.
Missing values apply to each period between country starting date and 2006. Criterion for inclusion in
samples is presence of continuous annual data back before World War I.
b. Excludes recently acceding members and Turkey.
c. Excluded from analysis for C sample because of insufﬁcient coverage.
d. Excluded from analysis for GDP sample because of insufﬁcient coverage.
e. Included in the GDP sample with data for log(GDP) in 1944 interpolated between values for 1943
and 1945. This interpolation does not affect the estimated decline in GDP during World War II.
f. Included in part of the analysis of GDP data despite the gap in information for 1941–45. This gap
does not hinder estimating the cumulative contraction in GDP associated with World War II.
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Egypt, Ireland, and Russia. We start our analysis of growth rates in 1870,
although earlier data are available in some cases.
Our present analysis uses growth rates of C and GDP and does not
involve comparisons of levels across countries. Therefore we can use
indexes of both variables, for example, setting their values at 100 for each
country in 2000. However, the level comparisons matter for the construc-
tion of measures of C and GDP for groups of countries, such as the total of
the OECD. To facilitate this analysis (and to allow for other uses of the
data that depend on comparability of levels across countries), we set the
level of per capita GDP for each country in 2000 to the purchasing power
parity (PPP)–adjusted value in 2000 international dollars given in the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). For per capita con-
sumer expenditure, we set the level for each country in 2000 to the value
given by the WDI for PPP-adjusted per capita GDP multiplied by the share
of nominal personal consumer expenditure in the country’s nominal GDP.
Sample selection issues particularly affect disaster studies because
data tend to be absent during the worst crises, especially wars. As exam-
ples, Malaysia and Singapore have data on C and GDP since 1900 but are
missing information during World War II. Inclusion of the incomplete
Malaysian and Singaporean time series since 1900 in our analysis would
bias downward the estimated disaster probabilities, since the missing peri-
ods almost surely contain crises. We take the approach of excluding cases
with these kinds of selected gaps in the data. In addition to Malaysia and
Singapore, we omit Turkey (whose C and GDP data start in 1923, after the
Ottoman Empire’s crisis during World War I), India for C (where the data
start in 1919), and Austria for C (where the data start in 1913 but informa-
tion is missing toward the ends of World Wars I and II). More broadly, our
main response to this selection issue has been to try to expand the set of
countries with at least roughly estimated full time series.
The construction of estimates of C relied on various procedures. In
many cases we used existing long-term national accounts studies. Some-
times (for example, Canada before 1926) we estimated C as a residual,
starting from GDP and subtracting estimates of the other components of
GDP. Sometimes (for example, Switzerland before 1948 and Germany
around World War I) we constructed C from quantities of speciﬁc con-
sumption items, using estimates of expenditure shares to calculate changes
in C. The details of our procedures are in our Internet report.
One issue is the treatment of border changes. An illustration is the
reuniﬁcation of Germany in late 1990. We have data on per capita C and
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changes) and also after 1990. We have data for uniﬁed Germany from
1991 on. Since per capita C and GDP in East Germany (not well measured
before 1991) were much lower than in the West, the raw data on per capita
quantities would show sharp drops in 1991 if we combined the West Ger-
man values up to 1990 with the uniﬁed-Germany values thereafter. That is,
this approach would treat the uniﬁcation as a disaster event from the per-
spective of West Germans leading up to 1990. This perspective may or
may not be accurate for this particular border change,
3 but we do not want
to apply this approach to border changes in general. This procedure would
imply that the initially richer part inevitably regards the coming combina-
tion as a disaster, and vice versa for the poorer part.
Even without border changes, the use of per capita C or GDP as a macro
variable neglects the distribution of expenditure and income within a coun-
try. This macroeconomic approach, valid under some conditions,
4 assumes
that we can apply a representative-agent framework to the macro variables,
despite the underlying heterogeneity in productivity, wealth, and so on. In
this case, the joining of West Germany with another state (East Germany)
that happens to have distributions of expenditure and income with lower
mean values need not invalidate the representative-agent representation.
The appropriate macro-level procedure is then to smoothly paste together
in 1990–91 the initial per capita series for West Germany with that for uni-
ﬁed Germany thereafter. That is, the West German per capita growth rates
apply up to 1991, and the uniﬁed Germany growth rates apply thereafter—
with no discrete shift in levels of variables at the time of the reuniﬁcation.
We apply this methodology to all of our cases of border change because
we think that this approach can yield satisfactory measures of per capita
growth rates across these changes. However, this procedure can be mis-
leading with regard to levels of variables. These issues do not affect our
present analysis but would matter in the construction of measures of per
capita C and GDP for broad groups of countries, such as the total of the
OECD.
Table 2 reports means and standard deviations, by country, of annual
growth rates of per capita C and GDP. We consider here only cases with
annual data from 1914 or earlier. The sample periods end in 2006 and go
260 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
3. As an analogy, some South Koreans view a reuniﬁcation with North Korea as a pend-
ing disaster.
4. For example, Caselli and Ventura (2000) show that the neoclassical growth model
can provide a satisfactory representative-agent view of macroeconomic variables despite
heterogeneity in underlying productivity and wealth.
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Annual Growth Rates 
of Consumer Expenditure and GDPa
C GDP
Standard Standard
Country Mean deviation Mean deviation
OECD countries
Australia 0.0154 0.0506 0.0159 0.0423
Austria — — 0.0217 0.0709
Belgium 0.0189 0.0904 0.0203 0.0838
Canada 0.0192 0.0474 0.0212 0.0511
Denmark 0.0163 0.0538 0.0190 0.0370
Finland 0.0239 0.0568 0.0237 0.0449
France 0.0162 0.0674 0.0191 0.0642
Germany 0.0189 0.0570 0.0212 0.0811
Greece
b — — 0.0210 0.1013
Iceland — — 0.0254 0.0506
Italy 0.0173 0.0370 0.0213 0.0471
Japan 0.0248 0.0689 0.0277 0.0611
Netherlands 0.0190 0.0854 0.0188 0.0757
New Zealand — — 0.0143 0.0517
Norway 0.0194 0.0380 0.0231 0.0361
Portugal 0.0272 0.0448 0.0207 0.0431
Spain 0.0204 0.0727 0.0200 0.0453
Sweden 0.0208 0.0458 0.0230 0.0362
Switzerland 0.0150 0.0623 0.0150 0.0399
United Kingdom 0.0147 0.0283 0.0157 0.0293
United States 0.0185 0.0360 0.0217 0.0498
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 0.0189 0.0823 0.0164 0.0674
Brazil 0.0277 0.0780 0.0192 0.0507
Chile 0.0191 0.0905 0.0204 0.0596
Colombia — — 0.0236 0.0229
India — — 0.0140 0.0487
Indonesia — — 0.0160 0.0556
Mexico 0.0176 0.0655 0.0187 0.0421
Peru 0.0174 0.0463 0.0207 0.0482
South Africa — — 0.0130 0.0485
South Korea 0.0293 0.0689 0.0352 0.0743
Sri Lanka — — 0.0144 0.0455
Taiwan 0.0344 0.0872 0.0386 0.0807
Uruguay — — 0.0143 0.0787
Venezuela — — 0.0251 0.0893
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. C represents real per capita personal consumer expenditure; GDP represents real per capita GDP.
Countries included are those with full data from before World War I, as indicated in table 1. Periods are
from 1870 (or the later starting date with available data) through 2006. The Philippines is not included in
this table because data are missing for more than one year.
b. Value of log(GDP) in 1944 is interpolated between the values for 1943 and 1945.
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5. In order to have at least ten years of coverage for the 1870–1913 subperiod, table 3
considers only countries with data going back at least to 1904.
Table 3. Mean Annual Growth Rates of Consumer Expenditure and GDP across Countries,
Various Periodsa
C GDP
Mean of  Mean of  Mean of  Mean of 
Country sample  No. of growth  standard  No. of growth  standard 
and period countries rates deviations countries rates deviations
OECD countries
1870–1913 15 0.0141 0.0415 21 0.0141 0.0373
1914–47 15 0.0111 0.0871 21 0.0145 0.0885
1948–2006 15 0.0264 0.0257 21 0.0287 0.0284
1870–2006 15 0.0187 0.0538 21 0.0205 0.0544
Non-OECD countries
1870–1913 6 0.0135 0.0837 11 0.0159 0.0668
1914–47 6 0.0147 0.0886 11 0.0132 0.0704
1948–2006 6 0.0264 0.0544 11 0.0257 0.0436
1870–2006 6 0.0225 0.0750 11 0.0198 0.0606
All countries
1870–1913 21 0.0140 0.0536 32 0.0147 0.0475
1914–47 21 0.0121 0.0875 32 0.0140 0.0823
1948–2006 21 0.0264 0.0339 32 0.0276 0.0336
1870–2006 21 0.0196 0.0599 32 0.0202 0.0565
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. C represents real per capita personal consumer expenditure; GDP represents real per capita GDP. Samples
are limited to countries from table 1 with complete data on growth rates from 1904 or earlier, so that each coun-
try has at least ten observations for 1870–1913. Averages are not weighted.
back as far as possible until 1870; that is, the ﬁrst observation is for the
growth rate from 1869 to 1870.
Table 3 considers three subperiods: 1870–1913 (pre–World War I),
1914–47 (which includes the two world wars and the Great Depression of
the early 1930s), and 1948–2006 (post–World War II). The table shows
averages across the included countries of growth rates and standard devia-
tions of growth rates.
5 For the full period, 1870–2006, the average of the
growth rates of C for twenty-one countries is 0.020 (that is, 2.0 percent a
year), with an average standard deviation (s.d.) of 0.060. The average for
ﬁfteen OECD countries is 0.019 (s.d. = 0.054), and that for six non-OECD
countries is 0.022 (s.d. = 0.075). For GDP, the average growth rate for
thirty-two countries is 0.020 (average s.d. = 0.056). The average for twenty-
one OECD countries is 0.020 (s.d. = 0.054), and that for eleven non-OECD
countries is 0.020 (s.d. = 0.061).
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rates and lower standard deviations than the ﬁrst subperiod, 1870–1913.
For example, for GDP growth in the OECD countries, the reduction in the
standard deviation—from 0.037 in 1870–1913 to 0.028 in 1948–2006—is
the kind of change found by Christina Romer for the United States and
plausibly attributed mainly to improved measurement of macroeconomic
aggregates.
6 However, the most striking difference across the subperiods
involves the turbulence of the middle interval. For C growth in the OECD
group, the average standard deviation for 1914–47 is 0.087, compared with
0.042 for 1870–1913 and 0.026 for 1948–2006. Similarly, for GDP growth
in the OECD group, the average standard deviation for the middle interval
is 0.088, compared with 0.037 and 0.028 in the other two periods.
An important feature of the 1870–2006 samples is that they include
realizations of disasters, notably those in the 1914–47 subperiod, which
featured the two world wars and the Great Depression. These realizations
create fat tails indicated by excess kurtosis and usually lead, thereby, to
rejection in long samples of the hypothesis of normality for growth rates of
C or GDP.
7 For C growth the only case out of twenty-one in which nor-
mality is accepted (by a Jarque-Bera test) at the 5 percent level is the
United States (p = 0.23). For GDP growth normality is accepted among
thirty-two cases only for Iceland (p = 0.07), Switzerland (p = 0.15), Brazil
(p = 0.05), and Uruguay (p = 0.51).
Appendix B presents long-term graphs of real per capita C and GDP for
the twenty-four countries that have annual data on both variables from
before 1914. In each case the vertical axis has a natural-log scale that
ranges from 5.5 to 11.0 ($245 to $59,900 in 2000 U.S. dollars). These
graphs bring out the long-term trends and show the major economic con-
tractions. Note that a movement by 0.1 along the vertical axis corresponds
to a change in the level of per capita GDP or C of about 10 percent.
As examples, for Germany GDP and C fell during World War II, World
War I, and the Great Depression of the 1930s. For France the dominant
contraction was during World War II, with a lesser decline in World War I.
For Spain the main adverse event was its civil war during the late 1930s.
The United Kingdom shows declines in C during the two world wars; GDP
did not fall during the wars, but it did during their aftermaths. In the United
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6. Romer (1986).
7. The tendency for negative skewness—disasters rather than bonanzas—is less pro-
nounced than we anticipated. Over the long samples, for C growth, eleven of twenty-one
countries exhibit negative skewness, and for GDP growth, twenty-four of thirty-two exhibit
negative skewness.
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 263States the main declines in C took place during the Great Depression of the
early 1930s and in the early 1920s; GDP also fell at these times, as well as
in the aftermath of World War II. An unusual case is the very strong
behavior of U.S. GDP during World War II, while C remained fairly sta-
ble. The United States is also an outlier in the sense of passing the “ruler
test”—a ruler placed along the pre-1914 data happens to lie along the
observations post-1950. As noted by Timothy Cogley and by Barro,
8 the
United States is almost unique in displaying this apparent tendency for
the GDP data to return to a ﬁxed trend line. In other cases (even including
Canada, which comes close) the ﬁxed-trend hypothesis is rejected by the
GDP data. The full dataset corresponding to the appendix ﬁgures and to
the available time series for other countries is posted on the Internet.
9
Rates of Return
Our study involves the interplay between macroeconomic variables, repre-
sented by consumer expenditure and GDP, and rates of return on various
ﬁnancial assets. It does not make a major contribution to the construction
of long-term data on asset returns. Instead we rely mainly on existing
information, primarily that provided by Global Financial Data.
10 Table 4
shows the dates over which we have been able to assemble time series on
real rates of return. In all cases we compute arithmetic real rates of return,
using consumer price indexes to deﬂate the nominal-return indexes. As far
as possible, the return indexes and CPIs apply to the end of each year.
Table 4 considers three types of assets: stocks, short-term bills (govern-
ment treasury bills with maturity of three months or less and analogous
claims such as deposits), and long-term government bonds (usually of ten-
year maturity). For stocks some of the information comes from total-return
indexes, which combine price changes and dividends. In other cases we
estimated returns from stock-price indexes, using rough estimates of divi-
dend yields. We hope eventually to obtain data from Elroy Dimson, Paul
Marsh, and Mike Staunton to extend our stock-return data backward for
at least Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and
Switzerland.
11
Table 5 shows means and standard deviations of rates of return for
countries with nearly continuous annual time series going back at least to
264 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
8. Cogley (1990, table 2); Barro (forthcoming).
9. See www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
10. See Taylor (2005).
11. Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008).
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Table 4. Starting Dates and Missing Values for Real Rates of Returna
Stocks
Total Stock 
Country returns indexes Bills Bonds
OECD countries
Australia 1883 1876 1862b 1862
b
Austria 1970 1923 1885
b 1946
[1939–44] [1938–44]
Belgium 1951 1898 [1914–18, 1849  1836
b
1940, 1944–46] [1945–46] [1945–46]
Canada 1934 1916 1903 1880
b
[1914–34]
Denmark 1970 1915 1864 1822
Finland 1962 1923 1915
b 1960
France 1896 1857 1841
b 1841b
[1940–41] [1940–41]
Germany 1870 1841 1854 1924
[1917–23]
Greece 1977 1929 1915
b 1993
[1941–52] [1944–45]
Iceland 2003 1993 1988 1993 
[2004–06] [2004–06]
Italy 1925 1906 1868 1862
Japan 1921 1894 1883 1871
Netherlands 1951 1920 1881
b 1881b
[1945–46]
New Zealand 1987 1927 1923 1926
Norway 1970 1915 1819 1877
Portugal 1989 1932 1930
b 1976
[1975–77]
Spain 1941 1875 1883 1941
[1936–40]
Sweden 1919 1902 1857 1922
Switzerland 1967 1911 1895 1916
[1914–16]
United Kingdom
c 1791 1791 1801 1791
United States 1801 1801 1836 1801
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 1988 1939 1978 —
[1958–66]
Brazil 1988 1955 1995 —
Chile 1983 1895 1864 —
Colombia 1988 1928 1986 —
India 1988 1921 1874 1874
b
[1926–27]
Indonesia 1988 1925 1970 —
[1940–77]
Malaysia 1973 1974 1960 1961
(continued)
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12. The missing data for this group, involving two to ﬁve years each for six countries,
are mainly during major wars, for which real rates of return on all three assets were probably
sharply negative. This sample selection biases all measured rates of return upward, although
the quantitative effect cannot be too large because of the small number of years involved.
The effect on computed equity premia is likely to be even smaller.
Table 4. Starting Dates and Missing Values for Real Rates of Returna (Continued)
Stocks
Total Stock 
Country returns indexes Bills Bonds
Mexico 1988 1930 1962 1995
Peru 1993 1927 1985 —
Philippines 1982 1953 1950 1997
Singapore 1970 1966 1960 1988
South Africa 1961 1911 1936 1896
South Korea 1963 1963 1951 1957
Sri Lanka 1993 1953  1951 —
[1975–84]
Taiwan 1988 1968 1962 1990





Sources: Authors’ calculations using data mostly from Global Financial Data; stock-price indexes for
Japan 1893–1914 are from Fujino and Akiyama (1977); bills data for Colombia, Indonesia, and Peru are
from the International Monetary Fund. In some cases consumer price index data are from sources other
than Global Financial Data.
a. Years in brackets are years with missing data. Rates of return are computed on an arithmetic basis
using end-of-year values of total-return indexes divided by consumer price indexes. Stock returns com-
puted from stock-price indexes include rough estimates of dividend yields (or use actual dividend yields
in some cases). Bill returns are for short-term government bills (maturity of three months or less) or, in
some cases, for overnight rates, deposit rates, or central bank discount rates. Bond returns are typically
for ten-year government bonds but sometimes for other maturities.
b. Starting date is limited by missing consumer price index data.
c. Data before 1790 are not used. Bond data are for consols up to 1932 and for ten-year government
bonds thereafter.
d. Stock-price data are available starting in 1925, but estimates of dividend yields are unavailable.
e. January 1942 stock-price index is used to approximate year-end value for 1941.
the 1920s.
12 The ﬁrst two data columns show stock and bill returns, where
a common sample applies in each case to the two types of returns. The last
two data columns show analogous information for bond and bill returns.
We emphasize in the present study the comparison between stocks and
bills—and, hence, the customary equity premium.
For the seventeen countries with matched stock and bill returns data, the
mean real rates of return over long-term samples were 0.0814 for stocks and
0.0085 for bills. (For each country we used a common sample for stock and
bill returns.) Thus, the average equity premium was 0.0729. For the ﬁfteen
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stocks and 0.0093 for bills, with an average equity premium of 0.0699.
Since the stock returns refer to levered equity, the equity premium for
unlevered equity would be smaller. For example, with a debt-equity ratio
of one-half (roughly that for U.S. nonﬁnancial corporations in recent
years), the predicted premium for unlevered equity would be 0.0729/1.5 =
0.049. Thus, we take as a challenge for the model to explain an unlevered
equity premium of around 5 percent a year. This type of challenge is the
one taken up long ago by Mehra and Prescott.
13
The model should also be consistent with observed levels of rates of
return, including an average real bill rate of less than 1 percent a year. How-
ever, in the model simulations we choose the rate of time preference, ρ, to
accord with the observed average level of the real bill rate (taken as a rough
estimate of a risk-free rate, although bills are not risk-free). The reasoning is
that the main basis for assessing a plausible value of ρ is to consider
whether the implied levels of rates of return are sensible. Therefore, match-
ing overall levels of rates of return does not provide a test of the model.
For the ﬁfteen countries (fourteen of which belong to the OECD) with
matched bond and bill returns data, the average long-term rate of return on
bonds was 0.0266, compared with 0.0147 for bills over common samples.
Thus, the average bond-bill premium was 0.0119. The present study does
not address the bond-bill premium.
Table 5 also shows the familiar high annual standard deviation of stock
returns, which averaged 0.245 for the seventeen countries with matched
bill data (0.235 for the ﬁfteen OECD countries). The corresponding aver-
age standard deviation for bill returns was 0.088 (0.082 for the ﬁfteen
OECD countries). Thus, bill returns exhibited substantial volatility but not
nearly as great as that of stocks.
Consumer Expenditure and GDP Disasters
To isolate economic disasters for C and GDP, we ﬁrst follow the procedure
in Barro’s 2006 paper by computing peak-to-trough fractional declines
that exceed some threshold amount.
14 The earlier study used a lower bound
of 0.15, but we broaden this limit here to 0.10. The inclusion of contrac-
tions between 0.10 and 0.15 brings in many more events but has only mod-
erate implications for explaining asset returns.
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14. Barro (2006).
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sonable if growth rate shocks are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), so that level shocks are permanent. However, the method can be
misleading when some shocks to levels are temporary. Later we modify
the approach by using one-sided Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlters to attempt to
gauge long-run, as opposed to transitory, economic contractions. In ongo-
ing research with Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson, we are taking a formal
statistical approach that uses the full time series for C and GDP for each
country. This approach considers transitional probabilities for movements
between normal and crisis regimes and allows for varying degrees of long-
term effects of crises on levels of C and GDP.
The full results on measuring C crises are presented in table C1 in appen-
dix C and summarized in table 6. The coverage is twenty-one OECD coun-
tries (seventeen with enough data for our subsequent analysis) and fourteen
non-OECD countries (seven in our later analysis). For GDP crises, shown
in table C2 in appendix C and summarized in table 7, the coverage is
twenty-one OECD countries (all used in our subsequent analysis) and
eighteen non-OECD countries (ﬁfteen in our later analysis). For the sam-
ples used later, the mean size of C contraction (95 events for 24 countries)
was 21.9 percent, and the mean size of GDP contraction (152 events for
36 countries) was 20.7 percent.
To highlight some cases, the United States has been comparatively
immune to crises, with C declines of 16 percent in 1921 (possibly inﬂu-
enced by the inﬂuenza epidemic of 1918–20) and 21 percent during the
Great Depression in 1933. GDP declines were 10 percent in 1908 and 1914
(years affected by banking panics
15), 12 percent in 1921, 29 percent in
1933, and 16 percent in 1947. The last contraction, likely precipitated by
the post–World War II demobilization, did not exhibit a consumption
decline. For the United Kingdom, the two C crises were during the world
wars: 17 percent in both 1918 and 1943. There were no GDP disasters at
these times, but GDP did contract after the two wars, by 19 percent in 1921
and 15 percent in 1947.
For France we found three war-related disasters for C: 16 percent in
1871 (Franco-Prussian War), 22 percent in 1915 (World War I), and 
58 percent in 1943 (World War II). For GDP there were six contractions,
the largest measuring 41 percent in 1944. For Germany there were four C
crises: 42 percent in 1918 (World War I), 13 percent in 1923 (German
hyperinﬂation), 12 percent in 1932 (Great Depression), and 41 percent in
270 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
15. See Cagan (1965, p. 138).
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 270ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 271




Event or period  No. of decline























































Canada, 0.15, 0.11; Finland, 0.10;
France, 0.16; Netherlands, 0.10;
Spain, 0.18; Switzerland, 0.19,
0.22, 0.14, 0.14, 0.16
Argentina, 0.12, 0.28, 0.20, 0.13,
0.12; Brazil, 0.15, 0.16; Peru, 0.12;
Taiwan, 0.22, 0.13
Australia, 0.24; Austria, 0.45;
Belgium, 0.45; Canada, 0.13;
Finland, 0.36; France, 0.22;
Germany, 0.42; Netherlands, 0.44;
Norway, 0.17; Portugal, 0.22;
Spain, 0.13; Sweden, 0.12;
Switzerland, 0.11; U.K., 0.17
Argentina, 0.17; Brazil, 0.11; Chile,
0.32; Malaysia, 0.10; Mexico,
0.25; Singapore, 0.14
Canada, 0.20; Denmark, 0.24;
Germany, 0.13; Norway, 0.16;
Sweden, 0.13; U.S., 0.16
Brazil, 0.15; Chile, 0.18; Malaysia,
0.42; Mexico, 0.12; Singapore, 0.13
Australia, 0.23; Austria, 0.22;
Canada, 0.23; Finland, 0.20;
Germany, 0.12; Spain, 0.10;
United States, 0.21
Argentina, 0.19; Brazil, 0.20; Chile,
0.37; Colombia, 0.18; India, 0.22;
Malaysia, 0.26; Mexico, 0.31;
Peru, 0.14; Singapore, 0.10;
Turkey, 0.12; Venezuela, 0.31
Portugal, 0.12; Spain, 0.46
Venezuela, 0.11
(continued)
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 2711945 (World War II). There were also four crises indicated by GDP, the
largest a remarkable 74 percent in 1946, reﬂecting the economic collapse
late in World War II.
Many other countries suffered sharp contractions during World War II.
For example, C declined in Belgium by 53 percent up to 1942, in Greece
by 64 percent up to 1944, in Japan by 64 percent up to 1945, in the Nether-
lands by 55 percent up to 1944, and in Taiwan by 68 percent up to 1945.
Other noteworthy cases for C were the contractions in Spain during its







Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at www.
economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Calculations are based on appendix table C1. Data for war periods include noncombatants. C repre-
sents real per capita personal consumer expenditure.
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Australia, 0.30; Austria, 0.44;
Belgium, 0.53; Denmark, 0.26;
Finland, 0.25; France, 0.58;
Germany, 0.41; Greece, 0.64;
Italy, 0.29; Japan, 0.64; Nether-
lands, 0.54; Norway, 0.10;
Portugal, 0.10; Spain, 0.14;
Sweden, 0.18; Switzerland, 0.17;
U.K., 0.17
Colombia, 0.23; India, 0.13;
Malaysia, 0.34; South Korea, 0.39;
Taiwan, 0.68; Turkey, 0.30
Denmark, 0.14; Finland, 0.14;
Greece, 0.11; Iceland, 0.25, 0.12,
0.11, 0.18; Portugal. 0.10; 
Spain, 0.13
Argentina, 0.10, 0.10, 0.16, 0.25;
Brazil, 0.16; Chile, 0.14, 0.40,
0.33; Colombia, 0.10; India; 0.18;
Malaysia, 0.12, 0.14, 0.12;
Mexico, 0.16, 0.11; Peru, 0.18,
0.30; Singapore, 0.16, 0.12; South
Korea, 0.37, 0.14; Turkey, 0.11;
Uruguay, 0.10, 0.27, 0.22;
Venezuela, 0.20, 0.22, 0.32, 0.15
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Table 7. Summary of GDP Disasters by Event or Period and Country Groupa
Average 
fractional
Period and No. of decline Fractional decline in 


































Australia, 0.27; Canada, 0.12;
Finland, 0.12; France, 0.10, 0.10,
0.13; Greece, 0.11, 0.15, 0.23,
0.15, 0.14, 0.42; Iceland, 0.12;
New Zealand, 0.17, 0.11; 
Spain, 0.12; Switzerland, 0.16;
U.S., 0.10, 0.10
Argentina, 0.19, 0.22, 0.15; 
Brazi, 0.10, 0.26, 0.14; 
Chile, 0.11; India, 0.15, 0.10;
Malaysia, 0.10; Philippines, 0.16;
Singapore, 0.21, 0.34; 
Sri Lanka, 0.16, 0.14; Taiwan,
0.21, 0.11; Uruguay, 0.27, 0.15,
0.14, 0.20, 0.16, 0.12; 
Venezuela, 0.24, 0.22, 0.13
Australia, 0.12; Austria, 0.38;
Belgium, 0.48; Denmark, 0.16;
Finland, 0.35; France, 0.29;
Germany, 0.36; Greece, 0.18;
Iceland, 0.22; Netherlands, 0.26;
New Zealand, 0.11; Norway, 0.15;
Sweden, 0.15; Switzerland, 0.19
Argentina, 0.29; Chile, 0.10, 0.13;
India, 0.15; Mexico, 0.12;
Philippines, 0.12; Singapore, 0.17,
0.24; South Africa, 0.23; South
Korea, 0.11; Sri Lanka, 0.14;
Uruguay, 0.28; Venezuela, 0.17
Canada, 0.30; Germany, 0.14;
Greece, 0.24; Iceland, 0.16; Italy,
0.22; New Zealand, 0.12; Norway,
0.11; Portugal, 0.11; Sweden, 0.11;
U.K., 0.19; U.S., 0.12
Singapore, 0.39; South Africa, 0.24;
Turkey, 0.13; Uruguay, 0.14
Australia, 0.22; Austria, 0.24;
Belgium, 0.12; Canada, 0.35;
France, 0.19; Germany, 0.28;
Netherlands, 0.13; Spain, 0.10;
U.S., 0.29
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Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at www.
economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Calculations are based on appendix table C2. Data for war periods include noncombatants.
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Argentina, 0.20; Brazil, 0.20; Chile,
0.36; Indonesia, 0.11; Malaysia,
0.19; Mexico, 0.31; Peru, 0.26;
Philippines, 0.13; Singapore, 0.41;
Sri Lanka, 0.15; Turkey, 0.12;
Uruguay, 0.37; Venezuela, 0.16
Portugal, 0.15; Spain, 0.31
Malaysia, 0.12; Singapore, 0.15;
South Korea, 0.10
Australia, 0.14; Austria, 0.59;
Belgium, 0.45; Denmark, 0.24;
Finland, 0.10; France, 0.41;
Germany, 0.74; Greece, 0.66;
Italy, 0.41; Japan, 0.50;
Netherlands, 0.52; Norway, 0.19;
Sweden, 0.10; Switzerland, 0.13
India, 0.12; Indonesia, 0.54;
Malaysia, 0.24, 0.36; Philippines,
0.57; South Korea, 0.48; Sri
Lanka, 0.21; Taiwan, 0.66;
Turkey, 0.40; Uruguay, 0.14;
Venezuela, 0.16
Finland, 0.12; Iceland, 0.14; New
Zealand, 0.12, 0.10; U.K., 0.15;
U.S., 0.16
Argentina, 0.10, 0.11, 0.14, 0.22;
Brazil, 0.11; Chile, 0.24, 0.18;
Indonesia, 0.16; Mexico, 0.13;
Peru, 0.10, 0.14, 0.32; 
Philippines, 0.19; Singapore, 0.34,
0.11; South Africa, 0.11, 0.10;
South Korea, 0.15; Uruguay, 0.12,
0.24, 0.19; Venezuela, 0.15, 
0.30, 0.26
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 274civil war, by 46 percent up to 1937, and in Chile during the 1970s military
takeover period, by 40 percent up to 1976.
U.S. studies often focus on the severity of the Great Depression; in fact,
some researchers gauge disaster probabilities entirely from this single
event.
16 One reason for this focus on the Depression is that the United
States happened to do well economically during the two world wars, which
were major economic disasters for much of the rest of the world, including
many OECD countries. However, even if one’s concern is limited to fore-
casting U.S. disasters or studying disaster probabilities as perceived by
investors in the United States, it seems plausible that the global experience—
particularly of comparable OECD countries—would provide a great deal
of information. Our perspective is that U.S. prospects can be gauged much
better by consulting the global experience, rather than overweighting the
United States’ own history, for which the few observed disasters are likely
to be dominated by luck.
In a global context, at least since 1870, the most serious economic dis-
aster in terms of incidence and severity of declines in C and GDP was
World War II. This event was followed in terms of economic impact by
World War I and the Great Depression of the early 1930s—two events
with similar overall consequences.
Among the thirty-ﬁve countries included for C in appendix table C1,
table 6 shows that World War II had twenty-three crises with an average
size of 34 percent. (This table includes noncombatant experiences as part
of the war periods.) World War I had twenty crises with an average size of
24 percent, and the Great Depression had eighteen crises with an average
size of 21 percent. The 1920s had another eleven events, including eight
with troughs in 1920–21, with an average size of 18 percent. As already
mentioned, the contractions at the start of the 1920s may reflect the
influenza epidemic of 1918–20.
17 We also found twenty-one pre-1914
events (for a truncated sample because of missing data) with an average
size of 16 percent.
The post–World War II period was remarkably calm for the OECD
countries: only nine consumption crises were found, four of which were in
Iceland (relating in part to shocks to the ﬁshing industry). The largest crisis
outside of Iceland was 14 percent for Finland in the early 1990s (a crisis
thought to originate from the changed economic relationship with the for-
mer Soviet Union). However, economic crises have not disappeared from
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 275
16. See, for example, Chatterjee and Corbae (2007) and Cogley and Sargent (2008).
17. Ursúa (2008).
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with an average size of 19 percent. The disasters here include the Latin
American debt crisis of the early 1980s, the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of the
late 1990s, and the difﬁculties in 2001–02 in Argentina related to the col-
lapse of that country’s currency board.
Table 7 provides a roughly similar picture for crises gauged by per capita
GDP. For the thirty-nine countries included in appendix table C2, World
War II had twenty-ﬁve events with an average size of 36 percent. World
War I had twenty-seven events with a mean size of 21 percent, and the Great
Depression had twenty-two cases with an average size of 22 percent. The
1920s had another ﬁfteen events—ten of them with troughs in 1920–21—
with a mean size of 18 percent. The pre-1914 period (where GDP events
were more plentiful than those for consumer expenditure) showed forty-
ﬁve events, with an average size of 16 percent. The post–World War II
period featured only six events for the OECD; the largest were the post–
World War II aftermaths for the United States (16 percent) and the United
Kingdom (15 percent). Again, the situation was much less calm outside of
the OECD: twenty-four events with an average size of 17 percent.
Consumer Durables
The consumption concept that enters into asset pricing equations would be
closer to real consumer expenditure on nondurable goods and services
(subsequently referred to as nondurables) than to overall consumer expen-
diture. That is, one might want to exclude durables outlays or, better yet,
include an estimate of rental income on the slowly moving stock of
durables. However, except for the OECD countries after World War II
(which had few crises), we typically lack the data to divide personal con-
sumer expenditure into durables and nondurables expenditure.
Table C3 in appendix C shows the twenty-eight cases among the C
disasters from table C1 for which we have been able to locate data that per-
mit a breakdown in the decline in real personal consumer expenditure into
durables and nondurables. Twenty of these cases are in our main sample
of ninety-five C crises. Not surprisingly, the proportionate decreases in
durables expenditure were typically much larger than those in non-
durables. On average for the twenty-eight crises, the proportionate fall in
per capita C was 18.3 percent, that in durables was 39.6 percent, and that in
nondurables was 15.1 percent. Thus, a substitution of nondurables expen-
diture for overall consumer expenditure would reduce the mean size of
contraction among the twenty-eight cases by about 3 percentage points.
276 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
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though signiﬁcant, impact is that the share of nominal durables expendi-
ture in total personal consumer expenditure is usually not large, averaging
8.0 percent at the peaks and 5.8 percent at the troughs for the twenty-eight
cases considered in table C3.
18 As an extreme example, for the United
Kingdom during World War II, the measured durables share fell to only
2.3 percent in 1943 (with household spending on automobiles falling to
near zero). But since the durables share of nominal personal consumer
expenditure at the peak in 1938 was only 4.9 percent, the adjustment was
still only 2.5 percentage points; that is, the proportionate fall in non-
durables was 14.4 percent, compared with 16.9 percent for all personal
consumer expenditure.
The average durables adjustment of 3 percentage points likely overstates
the overall effects. The reason is that we are systematically missing data on
the breakdown between durables and nondurables for the larger crises: the
mean contraction in C for the twenty-eight cases in table C3 was 18.3 per-
cent, compared with a mean of 21.9 percent for the ninety-ﬁve C contrac-
tions used in our subsequent analysis. The largest C contractions in table C3
are 46 percent for Spain in 1935–37, 36 percent for Finland in 1913–18,
33 percent for Chile in 1981–85, and 32 percent for Venezuela in 1982–89.
Consider an arithmetic formula for the magnitude of the proportionate
change in nondurables—this formula applies when durables and non-
durables are both declining, with the size of the fractional decline in
durables exceeding that in nondurables:
where C is total consumer expenditure, D is durables expenditure, and ND
is nondurables expenditure. We have already noted that the size of the
adjustment is limited by the modest share of durables in total expenditure—
this effect comes through the term D/ND.
An additional effect in equation 1 is that as we consider contractions
with larger magnitude for ΔC/C, the difference between the size of ΔD/D
and that of ΔC/C must, at least eventually, get smaller. For example, the
largest possible magnitude of ΔD/D is one. In this extreme situation, the
amount of adjustment in switching to nondurables has to fall as the size of
ΔC/C gets larger (with the adjustment approaching zero as the size of
() , 1
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18. The change in the nominal share of durables from peak to trough depends partly on
the relative growth rates of real durables and nondurables and partly on the relative growth
rates of prices of durables versus nondurables.
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 277ΔC/C approaches one). This reasoning suggests that the durables adjust-
ment would tend to be less important (in percentage points) for the larger
crises—and these are the ones that matter most for replicating the equity
premium in our later analysis. We do see this pattern in appendix table C3:
for Spain in 1935–37 the adjustment is from 46.1 percent to 45.0 percent;
for Finland in 1913–18 the adjustment is from 36.0 percent to 35.3 percent;
and for Venezuela in 1982–89 the adjustment is from 32.0 percent to
29.9 percent. However, for Chile in 1981–85 the adjustment is much
larger, from 32.7 percent to 17.9 percent.
In any event, we lack information in most cases on the breakdown of
personal consumer expenditure into durables and nondurables. Although
we may add a few cases, we will not be able to go much beyond the cover-
age shown in appendix table C3. Therefore, we apply the rest of our analy-
sis to crises gauged by personal consumer expenditure, C, in appendix
table C1, as well as to crises measured by GDP in appendix table C2.
Consumer Expenditure and GDP Disasters Compared
Table 8 matches C and GDP disasters for countries with full data (seven-
teen OECD and seven non-OECD). We match the C and GDP contractions
in appendix tables C1 and C2, respectively, by trough years—either the
same or a nearby year. In some cases a contraction by 0.10 or more in C or
GDP does not pair up with a decline of at least 0.10 in the other variable (in
which case the decline in the other variable does not appear in appendix
table C1 or C2). In those cases we enter in table 8 the actual decline in the
other variable (where, for a few cases, a negative value means that the vari-
able increased).
Macroeconomists, particularly those familiar with U.S. data, tend to
believe that proportionate contractions in consumer expenditure during
recessions are typically smaller than those in GDP. Partly this view comes
from the Great Depression, and the numbers in appendix tables C1 and C2
bear out this perspective: as an example, the proportionate declines in the
United States up to 1933 were 21 percent for C and 29 percent for GDP.
The idea that C is relatively more stable than GDP reﬂects also the general
patterns in post–World War II macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, including
those in the United States. Since 1954, the standard deviation of the cyclical
part of U.S. real GDP was 1.6 percent, compared with 1.2 percent for real
consumer expenditure.
19 The main counterpart of the smoother behavior
278 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
19. Barro (2008, p. 185).





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 281of C than of GDP was sharply fluctuating investment. That is, the steep
declines in investment during U.S. recessions, including the Great Depres-
sion, partly buffered the decreases in consumer expenditure.
20 This buffer-
ing could also apply, in principle, to the current account balance; that is, a
procyclical current account would moderate ﬂuctuations in consumer
spending (and investment) relative to those in GDP. However, in the post-
1954 period, the ratio of the U.S. current account balance to GDP was
actually weakly countercyclical.
21
From a theoretical standpoint (and despite the validity of the permanent-
income hypothesis), it is not inevitable that consumption would ﬂuctuate
proportionately by less than GDP. These patterns depend on whether the
underlying macroeconomic shocks impinge more on investment demand
or on desired saving. This balance depends, in turn, on the permanence
of the shocks and whether they operate primarily as income effects or as
shifts to the productivity of capital. In a simple AK model with i.i.d.
shocks to the growth rate of productivity, A, consumption and GDP would
always have the same proportionate variations.
An important consideration during wartime is the sharp increase in gov-
ernment purchases for the military. This expansion of government spend-
ing decreases C (and investment) for a given GDP.
22 In our data many of
the C and GDP crises—and a disproportionate share of the larger crises—
feature these wartime expansions of government spending. In such circum-
stances C would tend to decline proportionately by more than GDP.
Table 9, based on the matching of contractions shown in table 8, covers
112 contractions overall, 70 for OECD countries and 42 for non-OECD
countries. Of the 112 contractions, 31 featured participation of the country
as a war combatant and 81 did not (the label “nonwartime” in table 9
includes noncombatants during major wars). In the eighty-one nonwartime
cases, the average proportionate decrease in C was slightly greater than that
in GDP: 14.6 percent versus 12.9 percent (12.6 percent versus 12.4 percent
for the OECD countries). In the thirty-one wartime cases, the margin was
greater: 31.8 percent versus 27.2 percent (32.0 percent versus 27.6 percent
for the OECD countries).
282 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
20. This pattern is stronger for consumption measured by expenditure on nondurables
and services, that is, when expenditures on consumer durables are grouped with investment.
21. Barro (2008, p. 429).
22. The declines in consumption and investment could be moderated by falls in the cur-
rent account balance. However, the option of borrowing from abroad tends to be severely
limited during a global conﬂict. Moreover, even in localized conﬂicts, combatants are likely
to be cut off from international borrowing.
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 282In terms of timing patterns, table 9 shows for the full sample of 112
crises that 66 have the same trough years for C and GDP. The trough year
for C comes later in twenty-six cases, whereas that for GDP comes later in
twenty cases. Thus, at least in the annual data, there is no clear pattern as to
whether C or GDP reaches its trough ﬁrst during crises. If we consider only
wartime cases, ﬁfteen of the thirty-one have the same trough year, whereas
C reaches its trough later in seven and GDP reaches its trough later in nine.
Thus, there is also no clear result on the timing pattern during wars.
One concern is that the apparent excess of the average size of C con-
tractions over GDP contractions might reﬂect greater measurement error in
the C data. In future formal statistical analysis of the C and GDP time
series, we will allow for measurement error that might differ across coun-
tries, over time, and between the C and GDP data. For now we can get
some idea about the role of measurement error by redoing the analysis
using trend values of log(C) and log(GDP) calculated from HP ﬁlters. We
use a conventional smoothing parameter for annual data of 100. Unlike in
the standard setup, we use one-sided ﬁlters; that is, we consider only cur-
rent and past values at each point in time when estimating “trends.” (This
procedure avoids the implication that people knew in advance of a coming
destructive war or depression, so that they knew that a major decline in
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Table 9. Means and Relative Timing of Matched Consumer Expenditure 
and GDP Contractionsa
Trough of C contraction occurred
Mean C Mean GDP In same year as  Before GDP After GDP 
Events contraction contraction GDP contraction contraction contraction
OECD countries
All (70 contractions) 0.190 0.174 35 19 16
Wartime (23) 0.320 0.276 10 9 4
Nonwartime (47) 0.126 0.124 25 10 12
Non-OECD countries
All (42 contractions) 0.199 0.159 31 1 10
Wartime (8) 0.311 0.260 5 0 3
Nonwartime (34) 0.173 0.135 26 1 7
Full sample
All (112 contractions) 0.194 0.168 66 20 26
Wartime (31) 0.318 0.272 15 9 7
Nonwartime (81) 0.146 0.129 51 11 19
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Means and timing are for the matched contractions listed in table 8.
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peak-to-trough decreases in C or GDP during crises, we calculate here the
proportionate peak-to-trough decreases in the HP trend values. This proce-
dure downplays short-lived contractions and tends to count only the more
persistent declines. It also tends to ﬁlter out downturns that are merely a
response to a previous upward blip in C or GDP. Most important in the
present context, the HP ﬁlter tends to eliminate “crises” that reﬂect mainly
temporary measurement error in C and GDP.
The HP ﬁltering procedure substantially reduces the estimated number
of disasters, from 95 to 43 for C and from 152 to 70 for GDP. The full
results are presented in tables C4 and C5 in appendix C. We matched the C
and GDP crises, as before, and found thirty nonwartime pairs (seventeen in
OECD countries and thirteen in non-OECD countries) and twenty-three
wartime pairs (nineteen in OECD countries and four in non-OECD coun-
tries), the wartime pairs indicated by italics in tables C4 and C5. In the
nonwartime sample, the average size of C decline was 12.0 percent, com-
pared with 14.0 percent for GDP (8.8 percent and 13.4 percent, respec-
tively, for the OECD countries). In the wartime sample, the mean size of C
decline was 28.9 percent, compared with 23.8 percent for GDP (27.4 per-
cent and 21.7 percent, respectively, for the OECD countries). Thus, the
HP-ﬁltered data generate wartime patterns that are similar to those found
before: the average C decline was larger than that for GDP. However, the
ﬁndings for nonwartime samples are reversed, with the average C decline
smaller than that for GDP. Thus, overall, the main robust ﬁnding is that C
tends to fall proportionately more than GDP during wartime crises. The
relative magnitude of decline during nonwartime crises is less clear.
Disaster Probability and the Frequency Distribution 
of Disaster Sizes
This section considers the sample of countries with essentially complete
annual time series since before 1914. We use twenty-four countries
(including seventeen OECD countries) on per capita consumer expendi-
ture, C, and thirty-six countries (including twenty-one OECD countries)
on per capita GDP.
23 For the C sample of twenty-four countries, we iso-
lated ninety-ﬁve disasters (appendix table C1). The top panel of ﬁgure 1
284 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
23. We include Greece and the Philippines in the GDP sample. Although GDP data are
missing for Greece in 1944 and for the Philippines in 1941–45, we can compute the peak-to-
trough GDP declines during World War II in each case: 66 percent for Greece from 1939 to
1942 and 57 percent for the Philippines from 1939 to 1946.
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Figure 1. Distributions of Consumer Expenditure Disasters by Size and Durationa
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
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11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 285plots the frequency distribution of these C declines. The bottom panel
shows the frequency distribution of the duration of these disasters (gauged,
in each case, by the number of years from “peak” to “trough”). The aver-
age size was 22 percent, and the average duration was 3.6 years. For the
GDP sample of thirty-six countries, we found 152 disasters (appendix
table C2). The top panel of ﬁgure 2 plots the frequency distribution of
these GDP declines, and the bottom panel shows the frequency distribution
of the disaster durations. The average size was 21 percent, and the average
duration was 3.5 years. Appendix ﬁgures D1 and D2 show the frequency
distribution graphs for C and GDP corresponding to the HP-ﬁltered data.
The mean disaster sizes are very similar to the nonﬁltered cases (22 per-
cent for GDP and 23 percent for C), but average durations are longer
because of the smoothing procedure (6.4 years for GDP and 6.3 years
for C).
In our subsequent simulation of a model of the equity premium, using
the disaster data to calibrate the model, the results depend mainly on the
probability of disaster, p, and the frequency distribution of the proportion-
ate disaster size, b. With substantial risk aversion, the key aspect of the
size distribution is not so much the mean of b but, rather, the fatness of the
tails, that is, the likelihood of extremely large disasters.
Suppose that there are two states, normalcy and disaster. With probabil-
ity p per year (taken here to be constant over time and across countries),
the economy shifts from normalcy to disaster. With another probability π
per year (also constant over time and across countries), the economy shifts
from disaster to normalcy. As mentioned before, we found 95 disasters for
C and 152 for GDP. Also as noted before, we measured disaster years
by the interval between peak and trough for each event. This calculation
yields 343 disaster years for C and 530 disaster years for GDP. The total
number of annual observations is 2,963 for C and 4,653 for GDP. There-
fore, the number of normalcy years is 2,620 for C and 4,123 for GDP. We
estimate p as the ratio of the number of disasters to the number of normal
years. This calculation yields p = 0.0363 for C and 0.0369 for GDP.
24 We
estimate π as the ratio of the number of disasters (all of which eventually
ended) to the number of disaster years. This computation gives π=0.277
for C and 0.287 for GDP. Therefore, whether we gauge by C or by GDP,
we can think of disasters as starting with a probability of around 3.6 per-
cent a year and ending with a probability of about 28 percent a year.
286 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
24. The main reason that these disaster probabilities exceed those in Barro (2006) is the
inclusion of disaster sizes between 0.10 and 0.15. If we consider only disasters of 0.15 or
greater, the probabilities are p = 0.0218 for C and 0.0192 for GDP.
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Figure 2. Distributions of GDP Disasters by Size and Durationa
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
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respectively, in the upper panels of ﬁgures 1 and 2, turn out to be well
approximated by Pareto or power-law forms. These representations have
been found to apply to an array of economic and physical phenomena,
including amounts of stock-price changes and sizes of cities and ﬁrms.
25
We plan to work out the application of power-law distributions to disaster
sizes in future research.
A Lucas-Tree Model of Rates of Return
The estimates of p and the b distribution can be matched with rates of
return determined in a representative-agent Lucas-tree setting.
26 Our theo-
retical framework, summarized brieﬂy here, follows that in a forthcoming
paper by Barro, which extends his 2006 paper to use the Epstein-Zin-Weil
(EZW) form of consumer preferences.
27 That is, we allow for two distinct
preference parameters: γ, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, and θ,
the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES).
We set up the model, for convenience, in terms of discrete periods.
However, the formulas derived later apply as the length of the period
approaches zero. The log of real GDP evolves exogenously as a random
walk with drift:
The ﬁrst random term, ut+1, is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance σ
2.
This term reﬂects “normal” economic ﬂuctuations due, for example, to
productivity shocks. The parameter g ≥ 0 is a constant that reﬂects exoge-
nous productivity growth. Population is constant, so Yt represents per
capita GDP as well as the level of GDP.
The second random term, vt+1, picks up rare disasters, as in Rietz’s ear-
lier work and Barro’s 2006 paper.
28 In these rare events, output and con-
sumption jump down sharply. The probability of a disaster is the constant
p ≥ 0 per unit of time. In a disaster, output and consumption contract by the
fraction b, where 0 < b < 1. The distribution of vt+1 is given by
( ) log log . 2 11 1 YY g u v tt t t ++ + ( ) = ( ) ++ +
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25. See Mandelbrot (1963), Fama (1965), and Gabaix (1999).
26. Lucas (1978).
27. Epstein and Zin (1989); Weil (1990).
28. Rietz (1988); Barro (2006).
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by the empirical densities shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2.
In the baseline Lucas-tree setting—a closed economy with no invest-
ment and no government purchases—the representative agent’s consump-
tion, Ct, equals output, Yt.
29 Given the processes that generate ut+1 and vt+1,
the expected growth rate of Ct and Yt, denoted by g*, is given by
where E(b) is the expected value of b. (Note that we have allowed for dis-
asters but not for “bonanzas.”)
A key simpliﬁcation, which allows for closed-form solutions, is that the
shocks ut+1 and vt+1 in equation 2 are i.i.d.; that is, they represent permanent
effects on the level of output, rather than transitory disturbances to this
level. An important part of our ongoing research is to reassess this i.i.d.
assumption, in particular to allow for transitory effects from disasters,
such as wars and ﬁnancial crises. (Another important extension, needed to
match the observed volatility of stock prices and rates of return, is to allow
for time variation in the uncertainty parameters, particularly the disaster
probability, p.)
In general, EZW preferences do not yield closed-form solutions for
asset pricing equations. However, Barro shows that with i.i.d. shocks (as in
the present model), the ﬁrst-order optimizing conditions generate asset
pricing equations of familiar form:
30
where Rt is the one-period gross return on any asset. This speciﬁcation dif-
fers from the standard power-utility model (γ=θ ) in that, ﬁrst, the exponent
on consumption is the negative of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, 
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29. We can readily incorporate wartime-related government purchases, Gt, which do not
substitute for Ct in household utility but do create a wedge between Yt and Ct. In this case an
increase in Gt amounts to a decrease in productivity. Results on asset returns are similar in an
AK model with endogenous investment and stochastic (i.i.d.) depreciation shocks; see Barro
(forthcoming). In this setting, a disaster amounts to a large-scale destruction of Lucas trees.
30. Barro (forthcoming).
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 289γ (not θ), and second, the effective rate of time preference, ρ*, differs from
the usual rate of time preference, ρ, when γ≠θ . The formula for ρ* is
where E is the expectations operator and g* is the expected growth rate
given in equation 3.
The formulas for the expected rate of return on equity (unlevered claims
to Lucas trees), r
e, and the risk-free rate, rf, can be derived from equation
4, given the process that generates Yt and Ct in equation 2. The results are
Hence, the equity premium can be expressed as
which depends only on γ and the uncertainty parameters (σ, p, and the dis-
tribution of b). The ﬁrst term, γσ
2, is negligible and corresponds to the no-
disaster equity premium of Mehra and Prescott.
31 The second term brings
in disasters and is proportional to the disaster probability, p. The disaster
size, b, enters as the expectation of the product of b (the proportionate
decline in consumption) and the proportionate excess of the “marginal util-
ity of consumption”
32 in a disaster state, [(1 − b)−γ − 1]. This second term
tends to be large.
The formulas for rates of return and the equity premium in equations 6
through 8 depend on a number of assumptions. The baseline model assumes
that property rights in assets are perfectly maintained; in particular, there
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31. Mehra and Prescott (1985).
32. This interpretation would be precise for power utility (γ=θ ).
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can be extended to allow for partial defaults during crises.
33 Aside from
formal repudiation of claims, default can involve erosion of the real value
of nominal claims through surprise jumps in the price level. This type of
default tends to apply to government bills and bonds (which are typically
denominated in nominal terms), rather than stocks. If one interprets the
“risk-free” claim as a government bill, then a higher probability of default
on bills, conditional on a crisis, lowers the equity premium in a revised
version of equation 8.
The model also neglects government rationing of consumption during
crises, notably wars. Rationing can be viewed as a tax on consumption in
crisis states. The more effective the system, in the sense of precluding black
markets, the higher the effective tax rate on consumption beyond some
rationed quantity; thus, a fully enforced rationing system has an inﬁnite
tax rate at the margin. (In practice, the situation is complicated because
the rationing and hence the tax are likely to be temporary, lapsing once the
crisis is over.) Rationing can be viewed as a form of partial default on
assets, as above, but one that applies equally to gross returns on stocks and
bills. Therefore, although rationing tends to lower the equity premium in
an extended version of equation 8, the effects are weaker than those from
crisis-contingent defaults that apply only to bills.
Another issue for empirical implementation is that the model does not
deal with the duration of disaster states; a disaster is a jump that takes place
in one period, which amounts to an instant of time. Our research with
Nakamura and Steinsson will deal explicitly with the time evolution of the
economy during disaster states. For present purposes we assume that the
important aspect of a disaster is the cumulative amount of contraction, b,
which we gauge empirically by the numbers shown for C and GDP,
respectively, in appendix tables C1 and C2. That is, we assume that, for a
given cumulative decline, the implications for the equity premium do not
depend a great deal on whether this decline occurs in an instant or, more
realistically, is spread out over time.
To illustrate our assumption, ﬁgure 3 depicts two possible time paths
for the log of C. Each case has two normalcy intervals, denoted A and B.
These paths reflect growth at 0.025 per year and (different) realizations
of normal shocks with a standard deviation, σ, of 0.02 per year—these 
parameters apply in our subsequent simulations. In each case a single disas-
ter event with a cumulative fractional decline in C by 0.4 happens to occur
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 291
33. See Barro (2006).
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Figure 3. Paths of Consumption with Different Durations of Crisesa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. In case 1 a crisis entails a 40 percent decline in C over one period. In case 2 a crisis entails a 40 
percent decline in C stretched over four periods. The normalcy periods (A and B in each panel) are 
generated by assuming mean growth of 0.025 per year with normally distributed shocks that have a 
standard deviation of 0.02 per year. The paths shown, meant only to be illustrative, reflect different 





























11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 292in the middle of the sample. We are unsure at present how to model disas-
ter states that last for more than an instant. The mean growth rate is likely to
be much lower than normal, and the volatility is likely to be much higher
than normal. In ﬁgure 3 the only difference between the two cases is that
the fractional decline by 0.4 for the disaster in case 1 occurs over one period
(which could be one year or one second), whereas that in case 2 stretches
over four periods. The graphs assume, unrealistically, that crises have the
usual amount of volatility—that is, normal shocks with σ=0.02 per year.
Our key assumption is that the determination of expected rates of return
during normalcy periods (A and B in the two panels of ﬁgure 3) is roughly
the same whether disasters look like case 1 or case 2. This conclusion
holds in an extension of the model pursued in Barro’s 2006 paper,
34 which
assessed the effects of variations in the period length T. (This extension was
feasible in a model with i.i.d. growth shocks.) In that setting T represents
the ﬁxed duration of a disaster. Variations in T between zero and 5 years did
not have much impact on the implied equity premium (measured per year).
In practice, the normalcy rates of return would not be exactly the same
in cases 1 and 2 of ﬁgure 3. For example, case 2 implies low, perhaps neg-
ative short-term risk-free rates during crises and, therefore, capital gains
on longer-term risk-free bonds when a crisis starts. This pattern has impli-
cations for the term structure of risk-free rates during normal times. How-
ever, a different speciﬁcation—one where disasters entail higher than
usual chances of default on bonds—predicts capital losses, rather than
gains, on longer-term bonds when a crisis occurs. Because of this ambigu-
ity, we are unable at this stage to go beyond our assumption that cases 1
and 2 are approximately the same for the equity premium.
Simulating the Lucas-Tree Model
We now simulate the Lucas-tree model by viewing the Euler condition in
equation 4 as applying to a representative agent at the country level. That
is, we neglect the implications of imperfect markets and heterogeneous
individuals within countries. However, we also assume that markets are
not sufﬁciently complete internationally for equation 4 to apply to the rep-
resentative agent in the world. In future work we will assess how the analy-
sis applies to multiple-country regions, rather than country by country.
In applying equation 4 to the determination of each country’s asset
returns, we neglect any implications from international trade in goods and
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 293
34. Barro (2006, section V).
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this perspective, we can view each country-period observation as pro-
viding independent information about the relationship between macro-
economic shocks and asset returns. In particular, this independence may be
approximately right despite the clear common international dimensions of
crises—most obviously from wars but also from ﬁnancial crises, disease
epidemics, and natural resource shocks.
We apply the full historical information on disaster probability and
sizes to the simulation at each point in time. Thus, we implicitly assume
that the underlying parameters are ﬁxed over time and across countries and
are known from the outset to the representative agent in each country. We
therefore neglect learning about disaster parameters.
35
We focus on the model’s implications for the expected rate of return on
equity, r
e, and the risk-free rate, rf, and hence for the equity premium. As it
stands, the model is inadequate for explaining the volatility of asset prices,
including stock prices. For example, the model unrealistically implies 
a constant price-dividend ratio and a constant risk-free rate. The most
promising avenue for extending the model to ﬁt these features—including
the high volatility of stock returns—is to allow for shifting uncertainty
parameters, notably the disaster probability, p. This possibility is explored
in a recent paper by Xavier Gabaix; his results suggest that the extended
model can explain volatility patterns without much affecting the implica-
tions for expected rates of return, including the equity premium. In a
related vein, Ravi Bansal and Amir Yaron have pursued the consequences
of shifting expected growth rates, g*.
36
The calibrations of the model follow those in the forthcoming paper by
Barro. We set the expected normal growth rate, g, at 0.025; the standard
deviation of normal ﬂuctuations, σ, at 0.02; and the reciprocal of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ, at 0.5.
37 These choices of param-
eters either do not affect the equity premium (g and θ) or have a negligible
impact (σ). The rate of time preference, ρ, also does not affect the equity
premium. However, ρ (along with g, σ, and θ) affects levels of rates of
return, including the risk-free rate, r
f (see equations 6 and 7). Given the
lack of useful outside information on ρ, we set ρ* in equation 7 to generate
r
f = 0.01—roughly the long-run average across countries of real rates of
294 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
35. This issue is stressed by Weitzman (2007).
36. Gabaix (2008); Bansal and Yaron (2004).
37. For a discussion of the choice of θ, including the problematic nature of estimates
computed from macroeconomic time series, see Barro (forthcoming).
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 294return on bills from table 5.38 Then ρ takes on the value needed to satisfy
equation 5.
The calibrations for the disaster probability, p, and the frequency distri-
bution of disaster sizes, b, use our multicountry study of disaster events.
We can then determine the value of γ needed in equation 8 to replicate an
unlevered equity premium of around 0.05—the long-run average across
countries implied by the data in table 5. Since we always have r
f = 0.01, an
unlevered equity premium of 0.05 corresponds to an expected rate of
return on unlevered equity, r
e, of 0.06.
Table 10 reports results of our simulation for crises gauged by C, and
table 11 for those gauged by GDP. For baseline cases, which encompass
95 observations of C crises and 152 observations of GDP crises, a coefﬁ-
cient of relative risk aversion, γ, of 3.5 gets the simulated results into the
right ballpark for the observed equity premium: speciﬁcally, r
e = 0.059 in
the C case and 0.067 in the GDP case. The respective rates of time prefer-
ence, ρ, are 0.045 and 0.052, and the corresponding effective rates of time
preference, ρ*, are 0.029 and 0.037.
The results are sensitive to the choice of γ. For example, the second
lines of tables 10 and 11 show that if γ=3.0, the values for r
e fall to 0.042
in the C case and 0.045 in the GDP case.
The results are not very different if the sample encompasses only the
OECD countries, in which case the number of C disasters falls from 95 to
57, and the number of GDP disasters falls from 152 to 75. The equity pre-
mium is still in the right ballpark with γ=3.5 (or slightly higher for C
crises).
The results do not change greatly if we truncate the b distribution to
eliminate smaller crises. Tables 10 and 11 show the results when, instead
of b ≥ 0.10, we admit only b ≥ 0.15, b ≥ 0.20, b ≥ 0.30, or b ≥ 0.40. Even
when b ≥ 0.40, which leaves only eleven C crises and fourteen GDP crises,
r
e is still at 0.047 in the case of C and 0.054 in the case of GDP. Thus, the
larger crises are crucial for getting the equity premium into the right ball-
park with a “reasonable” amount of risk aversion, such as γ=3.5.
This reasoning also applies when we examine nonwartime samples, a
selection that eliminates the biggest crises from the sample. (We deﬁne
“war” as applying only to active combatants.) For C crises, the considera-
tion of a nonwartime sample—which retains sixty-six of the original
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 295
38. Real rates of return on treasury bills and similar assets are not risk-free and tend par-
ticularly to be lower than normal during crises that involve high inﬂation (see the section on
“Asset Returns during Crises” below). Thus, r
f may be lower than 0.01. However, pegging
to a lower value of r
f would not affect our analysis of the equity premium.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 297ninety-five disasters—yields re = 0.016. For GDP crises, with 112 of the
original 152 disasters retained, the result is r
e = 0.017. Getting into the
right ballpark here for the equity premium requires a much higher coefﬁ-
cient of relative risk aversion, γ. For example, tables 10 and 11 show that γ
= 9 yields r
e = 0.053 for C and 0.059 for GDP.
As discussed before, we redid the analysis using trend values of log(C)
and log(GDP) calculated from HP ﬁlters. As already noted, this method
captures in an informal way the idea that crises may have less than perma-
nent effects on levels of C and GDP. Tables 10 and 11 show that the HP ﬁl-
tering reduces the number of C disasters from 95 to 43 and of GDP
disasters from 152 to 70. Correspondingly, the estimated disaster probabil-
ities fall from 0.0363 to 0.0167 for C and from 0.0369 to 0.0174 for GDP.
However, the size distributions of the crises are not so different from the
baseline cases. For C crises the mean of b is 0.232, rather than 0.219, and
for GDP the mean is 0.224, rather than 0.207. Hence, the HP ﬁltering
decreases the number of disasters but slightly raises the average size, con-
tingent on the occurrence of a disaster.
If we again use a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, γ, of 3.5, the HP
filtering lowers the computed r
e to 0.030 for the C case and to 0.036 for
the GDP case. However, γ does not have to increase very much to restore a
reasonable equity premium. For example, for C crises, γ=4.5 yields r
e =
0.050, whereas for GDP crises, γ=4 yields r
e = 0.050.
In terms of broad patterns, the results based on C in table 10 deliver
results for the equity premium that are similar to those based on GDP in
table 11. On the one hand, this ﬁnding suggests a certain robustness, in that
the results are not sensitive to measurement differences in these two main
macroeconomic aggregates. On the other hand, it means that ﬁtting the
equity premium does not depend on our efforts in measuring consumer
expenditure and thereby getting closer to measures of consumption.
Overall, the simulations in tables 10 and 11 show that the model delivers
reasonable equity premia with “plausible” coefﬁcients of relative risk aver-
sion for a variety of speciﬁcations. The main lack of robustness applies to
elimination of the biggest crises from the sample, for example, by remov-
ing the war-related crises.
Asset Returns during Crises
In our Lucas-tree model of asset returns, crises feature downward jumps
in C and GDP at a point in time. More realistically, they fall gradually
during crises of varying lengths, as suggested by figure 3. In our empiri-
298 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 298cal analysis, we approximated the crisis declines in C and GDP by cumu-
lative fractional amounts over peak-to-trough intervals, as shown in
appendix tables C1 and C2 and figures 1 and 2. Now we carry out a pre-
liminary analysis that considers observed returns during crises on stocks
and bills.
Stock Returns during Crises
In the theory, real stock prices jump down discretely at the start of a
crisis. More realistically, stock prices would fall each time negative
information hits the financial markets. Since we are conditioning on
crises that cumulate to at least a 10 percent fall in C or GDP, the crises
typically feature more than one adverse piece of news (or, rather, more
negative than positive news). Thus, the stock-price declines tend also to
be spread out during the crises. By analogy to our procedure for measur-
ing decreases in C and GDP, we measure the crisis changes in stock
prices by cumulative fractional amounts. Specifically, the real stock-
price falls shown in appendix tables C1 and C2 are the total fractional
declines from the end of the year before the peak to the end of the year
before the trough. (Negative values indicate stock-price increases.) This
procedure omits changes in stock prices during the trough year, when the
financial markets would likely be influenced by information indicating
that the crisis had ended.
Data on real stock prices are available for only a subset of the C and
GDP crises: 54 of the 95 C crises (appendix table C1) and 72 of the 152
GDP crises (table C2). The majority of these crises show declines in real
stock prices: in forty-two of the ﬁfty-four C events (78 percent) and ﬁfty-
ﬁve of the seventy-two GDP events (76 percent). Figure 4 shows the size
distribution of real stock-price declines during crises (where negative
values correspond to stock-price rises). The left-hand panels show the full
distributions, and the right-hand panels consider only the events with
stock-price decreases. The left-hand panels have two outliers with very
large price increases: Argentina in the late 1980s and Chile in the mid-
1970s. In these situations, periods of economic contraction were accompa-
nied by major contemporaneous or prospective reforms that were viewed
favorably by the stock markets.
39 To admit the possibility of stock-price
increases during crises into the model, we would have to expand the
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 299
39. An analogous situation is the C crisis in Venezuela in the late 1980s (see appendix
table C1), which, however, is not included in the sample currently being considered.
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Source: See table 4.
a. The sample for consumer expenditure, C, disasters is the 54 of 95 cases for included countries from 
table C1 with data on stock-price changes. The sample for GDP disasters is the 72 of 152 cases for 
included countries from table C2 with data on stock-price changes. We exclude cases in which missing 
data cause the period for stock-price changes to deviate from that for the declines in C or GDP.
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Figure 4. Distributions of Real Stock-Price Declines during Consumer Expenditure 
and GDP Disasters
a
framework to allow for shocks to parameters, such as the expected growth
rate, g*, or the disaster probability, p.
The mean and median of fractional stock-price declines were 0.086 and
0.172, respectively, for C crises and 0.165 and 0.294 for GDP crises. Con-
ditioning on cases of stock-price decrease in the right-hand panels of fig-
ure 4 shows roughly uniform shapes for the frequency distributions in the
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40. Recall that the samples are selected by considering C or GDP declines of 0.10 or
more. We could instead select the sample by considering real stock-price declines of 0.10 or
more. Our conjecture is that the size distributions would then look like power-law functions,
as in ﬁgures 1 and 2.
41. An additional difﬁculty is the imperfect matching of the timing of stock-price
changes with the timing of the declines in C or GDP. In our data, stock-price changes are
from the end of the year before the peak to the end of the year before the trough. The
changes in C or GDP are from the peak year to the trough year, with C and GDP represent-
ing annual ﬂows for each year.
range of sizes between zero and 0.7.40 In this range the mean and the
median of stock-price declines were 0.327 and 0.288, respectively, for C
crises and 0.376 and 0.374 for GDP crises.
In tables 10 and 11 we simulated the underlying asset pricing model
using the observed distributions of C and GDP crises. The underlying
assumption was that the size of the fractional stock-price decline (for
unlevered equity) during a crisis equaled the size of the fractional decline,
b, in C or GDP. We can instead simulate the model by using the actual
stock-price changes during crises, as shown in appendix tables C1 and C2
and in ﬁgure 4. Since these stock returns refer to levered equity, these cal-
culations apply to expected returns on levered equity.
The asset pricing condition in equation 4 involves the term E[Rt   
(1 − b)
−γ], where Rt is the gross real stock return during crises, and b is the
fractional decline in C or GDP during crises. This expression is difﬁcult to
calculate accurately because stock-price changes are highly volatile, par-
ticularly during crises.
41 In table 12 we compute this term in four alterna-
tive ways. First, we measure contractions by either C or GDP, and second,
we use either the full distributions of stock-price changes (the left-hand
panels of ﬁgure 4) or the truncated distributions that consider only stock-
price declines (the right-hand panels). This last choice is more consistent
with our model and may also lessen the effects from measurement error.
The calculations using the full distributions of stock-price changes do
not accord well with observed long-term average returns on levered equity
of around 0.081 (from table 5). If we use γ=3.5, as before, the simulations
in table 12 deliver an overall mean rate of return on levered equity of 0.029
based on C crises and 0.031 based on GDP crises. The results fit better
if we use the truncated distributions, which eliminate cases of stock-price
increase during crises. The simulated mean rate of return on levered equity
is then 0.075 based on C crises and 0.034 based on GDP crises. Given the
wide range of results, we cannot, at this stage, reach ﬁrm conclusions from
our attempts to simulate the model using observed stock-price changes dur-
ing crises.
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In the Lucas-tree model, the risk-free rate is the same in normal times as
in a crisis, which lasts an instant of time. The same pattern would apply to
the expected real rate of return on short-term bills—the type of claim con-
sidered in table 5—if we introduce a constant probability of default or, for
nominal claims, a time-invariant process for inﬂation.
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Table 12. Results of the Simulated Model Using Actual Stock-Price Changes 
during Crisesa
C crises GDP crises
All crises Crises with All crises Crises with 
with stock  stock-price  with stock  stock-price 
data decreases only data decreases only
No. of observations 54 42 72 55
Coefﬁcient of relative  3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
risk aversion γ
Effective time-preference  0.029 0.029 0.037 0.037
rate ρ*
Normal growth rate g 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
(1 + g)
−γ 0.917 0.917 0.917 0.917
Disaster probability p 0.0363 0.0363 0.0369 0.0369
Stock returns
b
Overall mean E(Rt − 1) 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814 0.0814
(from table 5)
Mean of crisis sample  −0.0864 −0.3272 −0.1655 −0.3759
E(Rt − 1)
Mean of crisis sample  3.446 1.964 3.545 3.235
E[Rt  (1 − b)−γ]
Model simulation
Implied noncrisis
c 0.035 0.090 0.038 0.050
E(Rt − 1)
Implied overall mean
d 0.029 0.075 0.031 0.034
E(Rt − 1)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The parameters γ, ρ*, g, and p come from tables 10 and 11. Stock-price changes during crises are
reported in tables C1 and C2. The four crisis samples used are C crises with data on stock-price changes
(N = 54), C crises with stock-price decreases (N = 42), GDP crises with data on stock-price changes 
(N = 72), and GDP crises with stock-price decreases (N = 55).
b. “Mean of crisis sample E(Rt − 1)” is the mean for each crisis sample of the fractional change in real
stock prices. “Mean of crisis sample E[Rt   (1 − b)
−γ]” is the mean for each crisis sample of the interaction
between (1 + fractional change in real stock prices) and (1 − b)
−γ, where b is the fractional decline in
C or GDP.
c. Based on the following approximate formula, derived from equations 2 through 4 in the text
(neglecting the effects from normal ﬂuctuations, σ):
d. Based on the formula E(Rt) = p   (ERt) ⎟ crisis + (1 − p)   (ERt) ⎟ noncrisis.
11 1 1 +≈ + ( ) − ( ) ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ +− ( )
−− ρ
γγ * gp R b p t crisis
ii i i E E ERt noncrisis ( ) {} .
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Table 13 shows means and medians for real bill returns during the C and
GDP crises in appendix tables C1 and C2. (The bill returns for each crisis
are mean values from the peak year to one year before the trough year.)
These results apply to the main samples (95 C crises and 152 GDP crises)
when data are also available on bill returns (58 for C crises and 73 for GDP
crises). The average real bill return during crises was between −2 percent
and −5 percent a year, depending on whether a C or a GDP sample is used
and on whether the mean or the median is considered. Hence, the average
crisis return was below the long-term average of around 1 percent shown
in table 5.
There are two main issues to consider. The ﬁrst is whether a substan-
tially negative number, such as −2 percent to −5 percent a year, is a good
measure of expected real bill returns during crises. A major question here
concerns inﬂation. The second is whether our analysis of the equity pre-
mium would be much affected if the expected real return on bills during
crises were substantially negative. Since the second issue is more funda-
mental, and we think the answer is no, we consider that question ﬁrst.
One possible reason for a low equilibrium expected real bill return dur-
ing crises, suggested by ﬁgure 3, is that crisis states last for more than an
instant, and the mean growth rate of C in these states is negative. (A sup-
porting reason, not shown in ﬁgure 3, is that volatility tends to be unusu-
ally high in crisis states.) In these cases the risk-free rate and the expected
real bill return would be unusually low in crises. However, the key issue
for the equity premium is not the low level of the real bill return during
crises (caused by a low expected growth rate or some other factor) but,
rather, whether the incidence of a crisis imposes substantial real capital
losses on bills. Recall that bills correspond, empirically, to claims with
maturity of three months or less. Although the crisis-induced changes in
the real value of these claims are hard to measure accurately, substantial
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Table 13. Bill Returns and Inﬂation Rates during Crisesa
C crises GDP crises
Item N Mean Median N Mean Median
Real rate of return on bills 58 −0.051 −0.023 73 −0.052 −0.021
Inﬂation rate 87 1.13 0.066 123 0.961 0.069
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The results apply to the crisis samples used in the main analysis: 95 C crises from table C1 and 152
GDP crises from table C2. Data for real rates of return on bills and inﬂation rates are for the subsamples
that also have data on bill returns or inﬂation rates, as indicated in tables C1 and C2. The cells show
means and medians of real rates of return on bills and inﬂation rates for these subsamples.
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 303real capital losses can arise only if there are jumps in the price level or lit-
eral defaults on bills. Absent these effects, the pricing of bills in normal
times (and, hence, the equity premium) would not be much inﬂuenced by
the prospect of low equilibrium real bill returns during crises.
42 In contrast,
for long-term bonds, changes in real capital values at the onsets of crises
may be substantial and would have to be compared with those on stocks.
Thus it would be useful to analyze the crisis experiences of the ten-year
government bonds included in table 5. However, the measurement of
crisis-induced changes in real bond values will be challenging.
A different point is that the computed averages of real bill returns dur-
ing crises may understate expected real returns because of inﬂuences from
inﬂation. Crises do feature higher than usual inﬂation rates: table 13 shows
that the median inﬂation rates were 6.6 percent for C crises and 6.9 percent
for GDP crises, compared with 4.2 percent for long samples for all coun-
tries taken together.
43 Hence, one possible explanation for the low average
real bill return during crises is that the greater incidence of high inﬂation
corresponds to high unanticipated inflation and, thereby, to a shortfall
of realized real returns on nominally denominated bills from expected
returns. A shortcoming of this argument is that it requires inﬂation to be
systematically underestimated during crises (which are presumably recog-
nized contemporaneously).
A second possibility is that the reported nominal yields at times of high
inﬂation systematically understate the true nominal returns and, therefore,
lead to underestimates of the real returns. The reason is the understatement
of the implications of compounding for calculating true nominal returns.
44
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42. An analogous result holds for paper currency. The expected real return on currency
would be low during a crisis if the expected inﬂation rate were high. However, absent jumps
in the price level or literal defaults, currency held in normal times would still provide good
protection against crisis-induced stock-market crashes.
43. The inﬂation rate for each crisis in tables C1 and C2 is the mean value from the peak
year to one year before the trough year.
44. As an example, Peru’s crisis in 1987–92 featured very high inﬂation. In 1989 the
price level increased by a factor of 29. The International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS) reports, on a monthly basis, nominal deposit yields for 1989 aver-
aging 1,100 percent a year. The IFS staff tell us that an annual rate of 1,100 percent means
that the nominal value of funds held as deposits would rise over a year by a factor of 12. This
nominal return, in conjunction with the inﬂation experience, produces a real rate of return
for Peru in 1989 of −0.58 per year. Suppose, alternatively, that a nominal yield of 1,100 per-
cent means that returns are compounded monthly at a rate of 92 percent (= 1,100/12) per
month. In this case the nominal value would rise over a year by a factor of 2,500, implying
an astronomically positive real rate of return. The point is that when the inﬂation rate is high,
compounding errors of this type have large implications for calculated real rates of return—
and we think that these errors are regularly in the direction of understating true returns.
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 304We think that this issue is quantitatively important, and we are attempting
to improve our calculations in this regard.
Plans for Further Research
We plan in future research to expand the twenty-four-country sample for C
and the thirty-six-country sample for GDP. Promising candidates are
Malaysia and Singapore, both of which have gaps in the data around
World War II. Also promising are Russia back to the pre–World War I
tsarist period, and Turkey back to the times of the Ottoman Empire, for
which we currently have data since 1923. We are also considering Ireland,
particularly whether we can isolate macroeconomic data for the territory of
the Republic of Ireland from U.K. statistics for the period preceding Irish
independence in 1922. We plan also to reexamine the pre-1929 U.S. data,
focusing on the Civil War years.
We will try to go further in measuring the division of personal con-
sumer expenditure between durables versus nondurables and services.
Appendix table C3 shows the data that we have been able to compile thus
far for crisis periods. We may also attempt to add data on government con-
sumption. A key issue here is the separation of military outlays from other
forms of government consumption expenditure.
We plan to construct time series for C and GDP per capita at the levels of
regions that include multiple countries: the OECD, Western Europe, Latin
America, Asia, the “world,” and so on. These regional aggregates can be
relevant when countries are integrated through ﬁnancial and other markets.
There are tricky aspects of this exercise involving changes in country bor-
ders, and we are working on this issue. Once we have these superaggregate
variables, we will examine C and GDP crises at regional levels.
In joint work with Rustam Ibragimov, we will use the method of Gabaix
and Ibragimov to estimate the distribution of disaster sizes, b, within a
power-law context.
45 Preliminary analysis shows good results when treat-
ing the transformed variable 1/(1 − b) as subject to a power-law density
function with exponent α. With these results we can compute the key
expectations that enter into the theoretical model, such as E(1 − b)
−γ, as
functions of γ and α. Preliminary results suggest that the estimated α,
around 5, is consistent with a ﬁnite value of E(1 − b)
−γ, when γ is around
3.5. With these results, we can redo the simulation of the model using the
ﬁtted density function for b, rather than the observed histogram.
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 305
45. Gabaix and Ibragimov (2007).
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 305We are working with Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson on a formal sta-
tistical model of the evolution of consumer expenditure and GDP. We
will use the full time series on C and GDP to estimate the probability of
disaster (possibly time-varying), the evolution of economic contractions
during disaster states, the probability of return to normalcy, and the long-
run effects of disasters on levels and growth rates of C and GDP. We will
also allow for trend breaks in growth rates, as well as for some differences
in uncertainty parameters across countries and over time.
We are working with Emmanuel Farhi and Xavier Gabaix on a different
approach to measuring time-varying disaster probabilities. Our plan is
to use U.S. data since the early 1980s on prices of stock-index options to
gauge changing market perceptions of the likelihood of substantial adverse
shocks. In addition to considering the equity premium, we will apply
this analysis to the bond-bill premium, which we found to be about 1 per-
cent a year.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The National Science Foundation has sup-
ported this research. We thank for suggestions Olivier Blanchard, John
Campbell, George Constantinides, Emmanuel Farhi, Xavier Gabaix, Claudia
Goldin, Rustam Ibragimov, Dale Jorgenson, Emi Nakamura, and Jón
Steinsson. We appreciate help with the ﬁnancial data from Bryan Taylor of
Global Financial Data. On the construction of the database on GDP and
personal consumer expenditure, we are grateful for comments and contribu-
tions from many people worldwide. A nonexhaustive list includes Roberto
Cortés (Argentina); Felix Butschek, Anton Kausel, Felix Rauscher, Marcus
Schleibecker, and Rita Schwarz (Austria); Frans Buelens, Erik Buyst,
Jean-Jacques Heirwegh, Yves de Lombaerde, Kim Oosterlinck, Peter
Scholliers, Yves Segers, Eric Vanhaute, and Guy Vanthemsche (Belgium);
Claudio Haddad (Brazil); José Diaz and Eric Haindl (Chile); Adolfo
Meisel, Carlos Posada, and Miguel Urrutia (Colombia); Jakob Madsen
(Denmark); Riitta Hjerppe and Visa Heinonen (Finland); Claude Diebolt,
Thomas Piketty, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Pierre Villa (France); Carsten
Burhop, Davide Cantoni, Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Albrecht Ritschl,
Mark Spoerer, Beatrice Weder, and Guntram Wolff (Germany); Violetta
Hionidou, George Kostelenos, and George Manolas (Greece); Guðmundur
Jónsson (Iceland); Mausumi Das, Ramesh Kolli, Bharat Ramaswami,
Bhanoji Rao, Partha Sen, S. L. Shetty, Rohini Somanathan, and Nittala
Subrahmanyasastry (India); Ann Booth, Pierre van der Eng, and Kees
van der Meer (Indonesia); Stefano Fenoaltea (Italy); Yana Kandaiya,
306 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 306H. R. H. Raja Nazrin, and Wan Rahim Wan Ahmad (Malaysia); Aurora
Gómez, Stephen Haber, Sandra Kuntz, Jaime de la Llata, Graciela
Márquez, and John Womack (Mexico); Marjan Balkestein, Ferry Lapré,
Herman de Jong, Hein Klemann, Jan-Pieter Smits, and Jan Luiten van
Zanden (Netherlands); Brian Easton, Anthony Endres, Les Oxley, Andrew
Petty, Jakob Preston, Keith Rankin, Grant Scobie, and John Singleton
(New Zealand); Ola Grytten and Karin Snesrud (Norway); José Robles
(Peru); Ricardo Jose and Richard Hooley (Philippines); Luzia Estevens,
Pedro Lains, and José Tavares (Portugal); Paul Gregory (Russia); Ichiro
Sugimoto (Singapore); Olu Akimboade and Jon Inggs (South Africa);
Myung-Soo Cha, Nak-Nyeon Kim, Mitsuhiko Kimura, Jong-Wha Lee,
and Dwight Perkins (South Korea); Leandro Prados (Spain); Rodney
Edvinsson (Sweden); Felix Andrist, Philippe Bacchetta, Stefan Gerlach,
and Stefanie Schnyder (Switzerland); S ¸evket Pamuk (Turkey); and Jorge
Alvarez and Inés Morales (Uruguay). Many other researchers provided
invaluable contributions through their published work. All errors remain
our own.
ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 307































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 313314 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
APPENDIX B
Real Consumption and GDP per Capita by Country
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Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources see www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/ 
data_sets_barro.
a. Log scale ranges from 5.5 to 11.0 ($245 to $59,900, respectively, in 2000 U.S. dollars). Series start 
in 1869 or later depending on data availability.
Figure B1. Real Personal Consumer Expenditure and GDP per Capita 
in OECD Countries
a (Continued)
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Figure B2. Real Personal Consumer Expenditure and GDP per Capita 
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Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources see www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/ 
data_sets_barro.
a. Log scale ranges from 5.5 to 11.0 ($245 to $59,900, respectively, in 2000 U.S. dollars). Series start 
in 1869 or later depending on data availability.
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APPENDIX C
Characteristics of Consumption and GDP Disasters
Table C1. Consumption Disasters
Decline in 
consumer Stock- Rate  of
expenditure price return Inﬂation 
Country Trougha Peak per capitab declinec on billsd rated
OECD countries
Australia 1918 1913 0.238 0.144 −0.008 0.036
1932 1927 0.234 0.069 0.086 −0.032
1944 1938 0.301 0.225 −0.024 0.041
Austria
e 1918 1913 0.451 — 0.034 0.019
1933 1929 0.217 0.533 0.071 −0.004
1947 1938 0.438 — — —
Belgium 1917 1913 0.445 — −0.160 0.353
1942 1937 0.530 — −0.024 0.034
Canada 1876 1873 0.152 — — −0.023
1908 1906 0.113 — 0.014 −0.046
1915 1912 0.130 — 0.022
f 0.034
1921 1918 0.196 0.210 — 0.104
1933 1929 0.230 0.650 — −0.054
Denmark 1921 1919 0.241 0.502 −0.113 0.201
1941 1939 0.261 0.336 −0.120 0.193
1948 1946 0.144 0.040 0.005 0.025
Finland 1892 1890 0.102 — — —
1918 1913 0.360 — −0.194
g 0.389g
1932 1928 0.199 0.207 0.115 −0.041
1944 1938 0.254 0.168 −0.067 0.122
1993 1989 0.140 0.620 0.092 0.045
France 1871 1864 0.158 0.212 0.027 0.007
1915 1912 0.215 0.171 0.031 0.006
1943 1938 0.580 — −0.121 0.162
Germany 1918 1912 0.425 0.539 −0.101 0.186
1923 1922 0.127 0.654 −0.970 34.5
1932 1928 0.121 0.562 0.109 −0.035
1945 1939 0.412 −0.366 0.000 0.020
Greece
e 1944 1938 0.636 0.442
h −0.442 4.65
1946 1945 0.113 — — —
Iceland
e 1952 1947 0.250 — — 0.202
1969 1967 0.118 — — 0.108
1975 1974 0.107 — — 0.515
1993 1987 0.176 — 0.060
i 0.144
Italy 1945 1939 0.286 0.429 −0.236 1.02
Japan 1945 1937 0.639 0.457 −0.066 0.101
Netherlands 1893 1889 0.098 — −0.013 0.038
1918 1912 0.440 — −0.013 0.060
1944 1939 0.545 −0.506 −0.050 0.069
New Zealand
e 1944 1939 0.224 0.089 −0.009 0.031
Disaster period
(continued)
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Table C1. Consumption Disasters (Continued)
Decline in 
consumer Stock- Rate  of
expenditure price return Inﬂation 
Country Trougha Peak per capitab declinec on billsd rated
Disaster period
Norway 1918 1916 0.169 −0.035 −0.212 0.326
1921 1919 0.161 0.536 −0.032 0.094
1944 1939 0.100 −0.222 −0.062 0.090
Portugal 1919 1913 0.215 — — —
1936 1934 0.121 −0.434 0.044 0.010
1942 1939 0.104 0.084 −0.058 0.110
1976 1974 0.098 — −0.136 0.242
Spain 1896 1892 0.182 −0.088 0.079 −0.024
1915 1913 0.128 0.065 0.021 0.026
1930 1929 0.101 0.090 0.027 0.028
1937 1935 0.461 0.238
j −0.051 0.058
1945 1940 0.145 −0.079 −0.021 0.107
1949 1946 0.131 0.014 −0.029 0.075
Sweden 1917 1913 0.115 0.095 −0.014 0.074
1921 1920 0.132 0.251 0.052 0.019
1945 1939 0.182 0.173 −0.030 0.059
Switzerland 1872 1870 0.190 — — —
1878 1876 0.225 — — —
1883 1881 0.142 — — −0.018
1886 1885 0.141 — — −0.059
1888 1887 0.157 — — 0.010
1918 1912 0.108 0.475 −0.031 0.088
1945 1939 0.173 0.382 −0.052 0.074
United Kingdom 1918 1915 0.167 0.490 −0.117 0.188
1943 1938 0.169 0.123 −0.032 0.047
United States 1921 1917 0.164 0.584 −0.071 0.139
1933 1929 0.208 0.631 0.093 −0.064
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 1891 1887 0.123 — — 0.080
1898 1895 0.283 — — 0.030
1900 1899 0.195 — — −0.096
1902 1901 0.127 — — 0.059
1907 1906 0.123 — — 0.025
1917 1912 0.172 — — 0.047
1932 1928 0.189 — — −0.028
1959 1958 0.101 — — 0.507
1982 1980 0.104 0.575 0.516 1.09
1990 1987 0.160 −3.264 −0.249 18.3
2002 1998 0.249 0.401 0.090 −0.009
Brazil 1905 1902 0.148 — — −0.029
1909 1906 0.157 — — 0.023
1919 1918 0.109 — — 0.123
1921 1920 0.147 — — 0.099
1931 1928 0.201 — — −0.037
1990 1984 0.163 −0.271 — 6.42
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 320ROBERT J. BARRO and JOSÉ F. URSÚA 321
Chile 1915 1911 0.322 0.125 0.021 0.069
1922 1918 0.181 0.154 0.011 0.085
1932 1929 0.374 0.538 0.063 0.007
1956 1954 0.136 −0.315 −0.410 0.775
1976 1972 0.401 −2.470 −0.516 3.47
1985 1981 0.327 0.684 0.165 0.191
Colombia
e 1932 1929 0.181 0.263 — −0.090
1943 1939 0.228 −0.053 — 0.041
1999 1997 0.099 0.043 0.095 0.172
India
e 1942 1932 0.217 −0.814 0.003 0.016
1946 1943 0.130 −0.305 −0.053 0.086
1950 1947 0.177 0.504 −0.025 0.038
Malaysia
e 1916 1914 0.096 — — —
1920 1917 0.425 — — —
1932 1929 0.258 — — —
1947 1938 0.336 — — —
1952 1951 0.118 — — 0.164
1986 1984 0.145 0.434 0.036 0.014
1998 1997 0.124 0.533 0.036 0.029
Mexico 1916 1909 0.252 — — 0.031
k
1924 1921 0.118 — — −0.074
1932 1926 0.311 0.406
m — −0.025
1988 1981 0.161 −0.148 0.024 0.852
1995 1994 0.113 0.147 0.075 0.071
Peru 1914 1907 0.118 — — —
1932 1929 0.140 0.105 — −0.043
1979 1975 0.179 0.325 — 0.437
1992 1987 0.300 0.519 −0.522 24.8
Singapore
e 1916 1910 0.145 — — —
1920 1918 0.127 — — —
1931 1928 0.104 — — —
1951 1949 0.159 — — 0.098
1959 1956 0.117 — — 0.013
South Korea 1945 1942 0.387 — — —
1952 1949 0.371 — — 1.68
1998 1997 0.143 0.458 0.072 0.066
Taiwan 1905 1903 0.219 — — 0.076
1911 1910 0.127 — — 0.082
1945 1936 0.684 — — 0.148
Turkey
e 1932 1929 0.120 — — −0.031
1946 1938 0.298 — — 0.215
2001 2000 0.108 0.565 −0.078 0.390
Uruguay
e 1965 1960 0.099 — — 0.274
1984 1981 0.267 — — 0.338
2002 1998 0.219 — — 0.054
Table C1. Consumption Disasters(Continued)
Decline in 
consumer Stock- Rate  of
expenditure price return Inﬂation 
Country Trough
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Venezuelae 1933 1930 0.311 0.074 — −0.060
1936 1935 0.107 −0.069 — −0.058
1952 1948 0.203 0.103 −0.025 0.048
1964 1957 0.223 0.329 0.020 0.016
1989 1982 0.320 −3.493 −0.048 0.183
2003 1993 0.147 0.690 −0.043 0.421
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Italics indicate that the country was a current participant in an external or internal war.
b. Decline in real personal consumer expenditure per capita by 0.1 or greater, expressed as a cumula-
tive fraction from peak year to trough year.
c. Decline in real stock prices, expressed as cumulative fractions from the end of the year preceding the
peak to the end of the year preceding the trough (unless the timing is indicated otherwise because of
missing data). Negative numbers indicate increases in real stock prices.
d. Mean values from the peak year to one year before the trough year (unless the timing is indicated
otherwise because of missing data).
e. Not included in the analysis for the consumer expenditure sample.
f. 1913–14. g. 1915–17. h. 1937–40. i. 1988–92. j. 1934–35. k. 1909–13. m. 1929–31.
Table C1. Consumption Disasters (Continued)
Decline in 
consumer Stock- Rate  of
expenditure price return Inﬂation 
Country Trougha Peak per capitab declinec on billsd rated
Disaster period
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Table C2. GDP Disasters
Decline in Stock- Rate of
GDP per price return  Inﬂation
Country Trougha Peak capitab declinec on billsd rated
OECD countries
Australia 1895 1889 0.271 0.067 0.085 −0.050
1918 1910 0.118 0.188 −0.020 0.045
1931 1926 0.221 0.179 0.061 −0.013
1946 1943 0.145 −0.167 0.007 0.005
Austria 1918 1912 0.381 — 0.031 0.022
1933 1929 0.235 0.533 0.071 −0.004
1945 1941 0.587 — — —
Belgium 1918 1913 0.477 — −0.225 0.492
1934 1930 0.117 0.451 0.070 −0.052
1943 1937 0.453 −0.764 −0.033 0.045
Canada 1878 1874 0.117 — — −0.020
1921 1917 0.301 0.393 — 0.115
1933 1928 0.348 0.558 — −0.041
Denmark 1918 1914 0.160 0.132
f −0.045 0.128
1941 1939 0.239 0.336 −0.120 0.193
Finland 1881 1876 0.120 — — —
1918 1913 0.353 — −0.194
g 0.389g
1940 1938 0.103 0.142 0.017 0.024
1993 1989 0.124 0.620 0.092 0.045
France 1870 1868 0.095 — — −0.011
1879 1874 0.102 — — −0.002
1886 1882 0.133 0.296 0.028 0.000
1918 1912 0.289 0.395 −0.055 0.117
1935 1929 0.187 0.535 0.068 −0.039
1944 1939 0.414 — −0.147 0.197
Germany 1919 1913 0.357 0.736 −0.125 0.214
1923 1922 0.135 0.654 −0.970 34.5
1932 1928 0.280 0.562 0.109 −0.035
1946 1943 0.736 0.068 −0.009 0.028
Greece 1872 1868 0.106 — — —
1877 1873 0.152 — — —
1891 1888 0.233 — — —
1897 1896 0.151 — — —
1901 1899 0.144 — — —
1913 1911 0.419 — — —
1919 1918 0.177 — −0.553 1.38
1923 1921 0.238 — −0.203 0.369
1942 1939 0.660 0.448
h −0.331 4.31
Iceland 1883 1881 0.125 — — —
1918 1913 0.221 — — 0.206
1920 1919 0.157 — — 0.114
1952 1948 0.139 — — 0.235
Italy 1920 1918 0.221 0.374 −0.101 0.195
1945 1939 0.413 0.429 −0.236 1.02
Japan 1944 1940 0.503 0.239 −0.026 0.054
Disaster period
(continued)
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Table C2. GDP Disasters (Continued)
Decline in Stock- Rate of
GDP per price return  Inﬂation
Country Trougha Peak capitab declinec on billsd rated
Disaster period
Netherlands 1918 1913 0.258 — −0.021 0.070
1934 1929 0.129 0.582 0.057 −0.032
1944 1939 0.525 −0.506 −0.050 0.069
New Zealand 1879 1878 0.174 — — —
1909 1907 0.110 — — —
1918 1911 0.107 — — 0.040
1927 1925 0.117 — 0.057 0.009
1948 1947 0.119 0.003 −0.061 0.081
1951 1950 0.097 −0.049 −0.068 0.089
Norway 1918 1916 0.148 −0.035 −0.212 0.326
1921 1920 0.110 0.447 −0.117 0.194
1944 1939 0.193 −0.222 −0.062 0.090
Portugal 1928 1927 0.109 — — —
1936 1934 0.148 −0.434 0.044 0.010
Spain 1896 1892 0.119 −0.088 0.079 −0.024
1933 1929 0.096 0.464 0.061 −0.009
1938 1935 0.313 0.238
i −0.035 0.098
Sweden 1918 1916 0.150 0.169 −0.185 0.323
1921 1920 0.108 0.251 0.052 0.019
1941 1939 0.095 0.349 −0.071 0.104
Switzerland 1879 1875 0.161 — — —
1918 1912 0.191 0.475 −0.031 0.088
1942 1939 0.126 0.308 −0.080 0.105
United Kingdom 1921 1918 0.192 0.321 −0.069 0.130
1947 1943 0.148 −0.269 0.003 0.006
United States 1908 1906 0.105 0.365 0.019 0.041
1914 1913 0.095 0.160 0.034 0.020
1921 1918 0.118 0.293 −0.057 0.125
1933 1929 0.290 0.631 0.093 −0.064
1947 1944 0.165 −0.061 −0.062 0.076
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 1891 1889 0.189 — — 0.284
1897 1896 0.219 — — 0.069
1900 1899 0.147 — — −0.096
1917 1912 0.289 — — 0.047
1932 1929 0.195 — — −0.002
1959 1958 0.101 — — 0.507
1982 1980 0.111 0.575 0.516 1.09
1990 1988 0.141 −3.430 −0.355 26.6
2002 1998 0.220 0.401 0.090 −0.009
Brazil 1887 1884 0.105 — — −0.020
1893 1891 0.262 — — 0.248
1900 1895 0.135 — — 0.033
1931 1928 0.201 — — −0.037
1992 1987 0.110 0.358 — 10.8
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Table C2. GDP Disasters (Continued)
Decline in Stock- Rate of
GDP per price return  Inﬂation
Country Trougha Peak capitab declinec on billsd rated
Disaster period
Chile 1903 1902 0.111 0.015 0.022 0.055
1915 1912 0.105 0.185 0.000 0.090
1919 1918 0.126 −0.018 0.103 −0.014
1932 1929 0.361 0.538 0.063 0.007
1975 1971 0.240 −2.081 −0.479 2.67
1983 1981 0.180 0.499 0.296 0.151
Colombia None
India 1877 1875 0.154 — — −0.065
1896 1894 0.100 — 0.120 −0.060
1918 1916 0.146 — 0.004 −0.061
1948 1943 0.117 0.073 −0.058 0.082
Indonesia 1933 1930 0.114 0.406 — −0.186
1945 1940 0.545 — — 0.044
1999 1997 0.158 0.681 −0.066 0.440
Malaysia
e 1904 1902 0.100 — — —
1935 1929 0.193 — — —
1937 1936 0.117 — — —
1941 1939 0.235 — — —
1947 1942 0.361 — — —
Mexico 1915 1909 0.119 — — 0.031
j
1932 1926 0.314 0.406k — −0.025
1988 1981 0.128 −0.148 0.024 0.852
Peru 1932 1929 0.258 0.105 — −0.043
1979 1975 0.104 0.325 — 0.437
1983 1981 0.136 0.879 — 0.728
1992 1987 0.325 0.519 −0.522 24.8
Philippines 1904 1903 0.158 — — 0.234
1915 1913 0.116 — — −0.109
1935 1929 0.134 — — −0.038
1946 1939 0.572 — — —
1985 1982 0.187 0.736 −0.050 0.285
Singapore
e 1904 1902 0.214 — — —
1913 1910 0.337 — — —
1916 1915 0.174 — — —
1920 1917 0.235 — — —
1927 1925 0.389 — — —
1932 1929 0.412 — — —
1938 1937 0.151 — — —
1952 1950 0.345 — — 0.192
1957 1956 0.113 — — 0.033
South Africa 1917 1912 0.229 0.139 — 0.031
1920 1919 0.239 −0.200 — 0.009
1987 1981 0.113 −0.156 0.006 0.147
1993 1989 0.102 0.028 0.032 0.140
South Korea 1919 1918 0.111 — — —
1939 1938 0.104 — — —
(continued)
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Table C2. GDP Disasters (Continued)
Decline in Stock- Rate of
GDP per price return  Inﬂation
Country Trougha Peak capitab declinec on billsd rated
Disaster period
1945 1940 0.480 — — —
1951 1949 0.151 — — 0.492
Sri Lanka 1878 1870 0.158 — — —
1886 1883 0.141 — — —
1923 1913 0.138 — — —
1932 1929 0.147 — — —
1946 1942 0.211 — — 0.147
Taiwan 1905 1903 0.214 — — 0.076
1911 1910 0.114 — — 0.082
1945 1936 0.662 — — 0.148
Turkey
e 1927 1926 0.134 — — 0.033
1932 1931 0.122 — — −0.025
1945 1939 0.395 — — 0.283
Uruguay 1875 1872 0.269 — — —
1881 1878 0.153 — — —
1887 1886 0.140 — — −0.054
1890 1888 0.202 — — 0.181
1901 1896 0.156 — — 0.045
1905 1904 0.122 — — −0.081
1915 1912 0.280 — — 0.057
1920 1919 0.142 — — 0.099
1933 1930 0.367 — — −0.005
1943 1939 0.139 — — 0.033
1959 1957 0.118 — — 0.190
1984 1981 0.236 — — 0.338
2002 1998 0.186 — — 0.054
Venezuela 1892 1890 0.235 — — —
1897 1893 0.225 — — —
1907 1903 0.134 — — —
1916 1913 0.167 — — 0.025
m
1933 1930 0.162 0.074 — −0.060
1942 1939 0.155 −0.134 — −0.003
1961 1957 0.152 0.270 0.007 0.020
1985 1977 0.295 0.616 −0.005 0.121
2003 1993 0.259 0.690 −0.043 0.421
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Italics indicate that the country was a current participant in an external or internal war.
b. Decline in real GDP per capita by 0.1 or greater, expressed as a cumulative fraction from peak year
to trough year.
c. Decline in real stock prices, expressed as a cumulative fraction from the end of the year preceding
the peak to the end of the year preceding the trough (unless the timing is indicated otherwise because of
missing data). Negative numbers indicate increases in real stock prices.
d. Mean values from the peak year to one year before the trough year (unless the timing is indicated
otherwise because of missing data).
e. Not included in the analysis for the GDP sample.
f. 1914–17. g. 1915–17. h. 1938–40. i. 1934–35. j. 1909–13. k. 1929–31. m. 1914–15.
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Table C3. Declines in Consumer Durables during Consumption Crisesa
Share of nominal durables  Proportionate decline 
in nominal consumer  in real consumer 
expenditure per capita expenditure per capita
Consumer Nondurables 
Country Year Share Year Share expenditure
b Durables and services
OECD countries
Canada 1933 0.054 1929 0.085 0.230 0.507 0.201
Finland 1892 0.029 1890 0.042 0.102 0.132 0.101
1918 0.010 1913 0.017 0.360 0.655 0.353
1932 0.013 1928 0.030 0.199 0.636 0.182
1944 0.019 1938 0.038 0.254 0.634 0.237
1993 0.072 1989 0.138 0.140 0.512 0.062
Iceland 1969 0.101 1967 0.133 0.118 0.321 0.087
1975 0.134 1974 0.181 0.107 0.340 0.043
1993 0.102 1987 0.183 0.176 0.529 0.053
Portugal 1976 0.092 1974 0.101 0.098 0.195 0.091
Spain 1896 0.020 1892 0.018 0.182 0.063 0.185
1915 0.020 1913 0.034 0.128 0.405 0.109
1930 0.045 1929 0.057 0.101 0.238 0.090
1937 0.022 1935 0.034 0.461 0.642 0.450
1945 0.023 1940 0.019 0.145 −0.206 0.153
1949 0.025 1946 0.027 0.131 0.170 0.127
United 1918 0.040 1915 0.037 0.167 0.198 0.166
Kingdom 1943 0.023 1938 0.049 0.169 0.649 0.144
United 1921 0.094 1917 0.094 0.164 0.227 0.158
States 1933 0.076 1929 0.119 0.208 0.501 0.169
Non-OECD countries
Chile 1985 0.060 1981 0.098 0.327 0.695 0.179
Colombia 1999 0.088 1997 0.110 0.099 0.314 0.060
Mexico 1995 0.070 1994 0.082 0.113 0.340 0.077
South Korea 1998 0.063 1997 0.089 0.143 0.363 0.096
Turkey 2001 0.150 2000 0.195 0.108 0.315 0.056
Venezuela 1964 0.042 1957 0.079 0.223 0.581 0.184
1989 0.047 1982 0.073 0.320 0.643 0.299
2003 0.076 1993 0.081 0.147 0.478 0.105
Overall means 0.058 0.080 0.183 0.396 0.151
a. This table shows the universe of consumption crises considered in table C1 for which we have been able to
break down the decline in real personal consumer expenditure per capita into durables, on the one hand, and non-
durables and services, on the other. The latter category should be closer to “consumption.” Of the twenty-eight
consumer expenditure crises for which the necessary data are available, twenty are included in our main sample
of ninety-ﬁve crises in table C1.
b. From table C1.
Trough Peak
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Table C4. Consumption Disasters Gauged by One-Sided Hodrick-Prescott Filtersa
Decline in real 
personal consumer 
Country Trough
b Peak expenditure per capita
OECD countries
Australia 1920 1913 0.202
1935 1928 0.167
1945 1938 0.215
Belgium 1944 1938 0.505
Canada 1923 1913 0.166
1935 1930 0.136
Denmark 1943 1939 0.202
Finland 1919 1913 0.201
1933 1929 0.105
1944 1939 0.181
France 1874 1864 0.104
1918 1913 0.185
1944 1934 0.530
Germany 1920 1913 0.384
1947 1940 0.356
Iceland
c 1995 1988 0.096
Italy 1946 1940 0.221
Japan 1936 1928 0.123
1946 1937 0.515




Spain 1939 1929 0.416
Sweden 1945 1940 0.106
Switzerland 1945 1940 0.142
United Kingdom 1918 1915 0.109
1944 1939 0.160
United States 1934 1929 0.136
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 1933 1929 0.141
1990 1980 0.168
2004 2000 0.149
Brazil 1992 1985 0.158





c 1945 1941 0.095
India
c 1942 1933 0.184
Malaysia
c 1922 1917 0.297
1934 1930 0.141
Disaster period
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Mexico 1916 1909 0.194
1934 1926 0.240
1988 1982 0.115




c 1916 1910 0.103
South Korea 1947 1942 0.325
1952 1949 0.127
Taiwan 1947 1937 0.578
Turkey
c 1946 1940 0.222
Uruguay
c 1985 1981 0.189
2004 2000 0.134
Venezuela
c 1933 1930 0.499
1971 1961 0.148
1990 1982 0.331
Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Analysis is based on one-sided Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlters for the logarithm of real consumer expendi-
ture per capita, using a conventional smoothing parameter of 100. Declines are expressed as cumulative
fractions from peak year to trough year.
b. Italics indicate that the country was a current participant in an external or internal war.
c. Not included in the analysis for the consumer expenditure sample.
Table C4. Consumption Disasters Gauged by One-Sided 
Hodrick-Prescott Filtersa (Continued)
Decline in real 
personal consumer 
Country Troughb Peak expenditure per capita
Disaster period
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Table C5. GDP Disasters Gauged by One-Sided Hodrick-Prescott Filters
Decline in real
Country Trough Peak GDP per capita
Australia 1897 1891 0.255
1920 1913 0.109
1933 1928 0.163
Austria 1920 1913 0.346
1936 1930 0.226
1947 1943 0.455
Belgium 1919 1913 0.436
1935 1930 0.108
1945 1938 0.426
Canada 1922 1917 0.191
1935 1930 0.250
Denmark 1943 1939 0.165
Finland 1919 1914 0.225
France 1919 1913 0.208
1938 1930 0.180
1945 1939 0.310
Germany 1920 1913 0.321
1933 1929 0.172
1949 1944 0.663




Iceland 1921 1915 0.189
Italy 1946 1940 0.267
Japan 1949 1943 0.439
Netherlands 1919 1914 0.174
1935 1930 0.128
1945 1939 0.426
New Zealand 1888 1879 0.116
1933 1925 0.125
Norway 1945 1939 0.115
Portugal None
Spain 1939 1930 0.316
Sweden 1921 1916 0.131
Switzerland 1883 1876 0.110
1919 1912 0.132
1944 1934 0.127
United Kingdom 1923 1918 0.143
1949 1944 0.109
United States 1934 1929 0.221
Non-OECD countries
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Table C5. GDP Disasters Gauged by One-Sided Hodrick-Prescott Filters (Continued)
Decline in real
Country Trough Peak GDP per capita
Disaster period
Brazil 1900 1891 0.175
Chile 1933 1930 0.201
1977 1972 0.170
India 1950 1943 0.103
Indonesia 1947 1941 0.517
Malaysia
c 1941 1931 0.184
Mexico 1915 1910 0.105
1934 1926 0.243
Peru 1933 1929 0.137
1985 1976 0.142
1993 1987 0.269
Philippines 1988 1983 0.171
Singapore
c 1916 1911 0.212
1928 1925 0.153
1932 1930 0.178
South Africa 1994 1984 0.156
South Korea 1952 1942 0.486
Sri Lanka 1923 1914 0.107
Taiwan 1947 1938 0.594
Turkey
c 1945 1940 0.276










Source: Authors’ construction; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. Analysis is based on one-sided Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlters for the logarithm of real GDP per capita,
using a conventional smoothing parameter of 100. Declines by 0.1 or greater are expressed as cumulative
fractions from peak year to trough year.
b. Italics indicate that the country was a current participant in an external or internal war.
c. Not included in the analysis for the GDP sample.
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APPENDIX D
Distributions of Disasters Using 
Hodrick-Prescott-Filtered Data
Figure D1. Distributions of Consumer Expenditure Disasters by Size and Duration,
One-Sided HP-Filtered
a
Source: Authors’ calculation; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.






N = 43, mean = 0.232
N = 43, mean = 6.3
By size
By duration
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Figure D2. Distributions of GDP Disasters by Size and Duration, 
One-Sided HP-Filtered
a
Source: Authors’ calculation; for details on sources and procedures see the online appendix at 
www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
a. The sample is the seventy GDP disasters listed as in the sample in table C5 in appendix C.
12
No. of events
N = 70, mean = 0.224
N = 70, mean = 6.4
Cumulative fractional decline in HP-filtered GDP per capita
4
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
OLIVIER J. BLANCHARD Even if one is not deeply interested in the
equity premium puzzle, this paper by Robert Barro and José Ursúa will
prove extremely useful. Understanding the economic implications of dis-
asters, whether natural or man-made, is both essential and fascinating.
Like the celebrated Barro-Lee growth dataset, the dataset that the authors
have carefully put together for this project will be widely used. I had fun
playing with it, and so will others.
I shall organize my comments around two points. The ﬁrst is that macro-
economic crises—what the authors call consumption and GDP disasters—
come in very different forms, with different implications for output,
consumption, and rates of return on bills, bonds, and stocks. The second is
that if the focus is on the equity premium, and if one takes seriously the
claim that the authors have now provided a representative sample of disas-
ters, then looking at the determination of the equity premium through the
lens of the Lucas model does not seem the best way to proceed.
THE MANY INCARNATIONS OF CONSUMPTION DISASTERS What I was most
struck by, looking at the consumption disasters identiﬁed and documented
by the authors, was how different these disasters in fact were one from
another. As I went through the list, it became fairly clear that the disasters
should be put in different boxes. Here is a tentative breakdown.
Wars on one’s own soil. For obvious reasons, a war on one’s own soil
leads to a large decline in output and consumption. Part of the country is
occupied by the enemy, and production in the rest is seriously disrupted.
I thank Antoine Bozio for information about the French stock market, Pedro Portugal
for information about the Portuguese stock market, and the authors for providing me with
their data.
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of rationing, inﬂation may be high; real bill returns are likely to be low.
A good example is France during World War II. From 1937 to 1944,
output per capita in France decreased by 51 percent (using log differ-
ences); not until 1947 did it return to its 1937 level. From 1938 to 1943,
consumption per capita decreased by 86 percent (this seems extremely
large); not until 1949 did it return to its 1938 level.
1
The German invasion closed the stock market. It reopened under the
Vichy regime, but, not surprisingly, volume remained very low during the
war.
2 (This raises the issue of what one should assume for stock returns
when the market is closed. Could one reasonably argue that if one cannot
sell one’s stock, the rate of return in such years is −100 percent?) Leaving
1940 and 1941 aside, the average yearly rate of return on stocks from 1938
to 1947 was −10 percent.
Despite widespread rationing, average inﬂation in France during the
war was high. From 1938 to 1944, annual inﬂation as measured by the con-
sumer price index averaged 18.7 percent, leading to large negative bill and
bond returns. (Rationing also raises the issue of whether it makes sense to
use the ﬁrst-order condition of consumers. This condition relies on a
thought experiment in which a larger return on the asset allows one to
increase consumption at the margin, but such an increase may not feasible
under rationing.) As is often the case, the immediate postwar period was
associated with a burst of inﬂation, leading to even larger negative bill and
bond returns. Inﬂation from 1945 to 1948 averaged 58.7 percent, and bill
and bond returns were negative and very large.
Wars on foreign soil. Wars on foreign soil have a very different eco-
nomic profile. With the increase in defense spending, output is likely to
increase, but its composition is likely to change drastically. Whether
through rationing or through other means, consumption is likely to fall.
After the initial bad news that a war is imminent, the stock market, pushed
by defense stocks, is likely to do well. Depending on the form of rationing
and the extent of forced saving, inﬂation is likely to rise, while nominal
rates of return are kept low, leading to negative real bond returns.
The standard example here is the United States during World War II.
From 1941 to 1945, U.S. output per capita grew by 34 percent. Consumption
per capita dipped by 3 percent from 1941 to 1942 but was still 5 percent
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1. All the numbers on GDP, consumption, and stock and bond returns cited in this com-
ment are from the Barro-Ursúa database.
2. The authors assume that it was closed during both 1940 and 1941. My French histo-
rian friends tell me that it was closed only for a few weeks in 1940.
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not large enough to make the authors’ “consumption disaster” list. Inter-
estingly (and I return to this below), the United States does make the “GDP
disaster” list in the 1940s, but, perhaps surprisingly, for the period 1944 to
1947, which includes the ﬁrst two postwar years. The reason is the return of
the U.S. economy from the wartime boom to a more normal level of output.
With the boom and the increase in defense spending, U.S. stock returns
were high during the war. From 1941 to 1945, annual stock returns aver-
aged 12 percent; from 1942 to 1945, they averaged 20.9 percent. Despite
price controls, inﬂation ran at an average 5 percent a year from 1941 to
1945. Coupled with very low nominal interest rates aimed at limiting the
burden of increasing government debt, the result was negative rates of
return on government bonds. As in France, the immediate aftermath of the
war was characterized by a burst of inﬂation, which reached 18 percent in
1946, leading to large negative returns on nominal assets.
Civil wars. Civil wars offer yet another pattern of co-movements among
output, consumption, and stock and bond returns. A leftist revolution, for
example, may lead to an initial shift in income distribution and an initial
increase in consumption, followed later by lower output and lower con-
sumption. Companies are likely to be nationalized, and stock returns are
likely to suffer. Loss of government revenue is likely to lead to rapid
money growth, high inﬂation, and large losses on nominal assets.
Portugal provides a nice example. In 1974, after a long dictatorship and
the loss of Portugal’s colonies, a bloodless coup put leftist colonels in
charge. Political and economic turmoil ensued, together with large-scale
nationalization of ﬁrms. Although output decreased marginally from 1973
to 1974, consumption increased by 7 percent (one may, however, reason-
ably question whether the consumption of stockholders increased as well).
The measured labor share of income exceeded 100 percent of GDP, and so
it is no great surprise that both output and consumption declined in the fol-
lowing years. Not until 1978 did they exceed their 1973 level.
Not surprisingly, the Portuguese stock market did not do well. The mar-
ket was closed from April 1974 to February 1977. Measured stock returns
were negative and large in 1978. But bill returns did not fare much better.
Inﬂation averaged 20 percent a year from 1974 to 1978 and remained
above 20 percent until 1985. Nominal interest rates were substantially
lower, implying large negative real returns.
Other types of crisis, and some implications. One could go on. Another
box would include ﬁscal crises. Fiscal crises accompanied by hyperinﬂa-
tions are likely to feature low output and low consumption. Stock returns
338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
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inﬂation of 1923 is the obvious example. During this consumption disaster,
as deﬁned by the authors’ dates, stock prices declined by 65.4 percent. But
the real rate of return on bills was −97 percent. Another box would include
banking crises, such as that in Finland in the early 1990s, and so on.
In going through these cases, I have done what Barro and Ursúa pre-
cisely do not want us to do. I have tried to think about each data point and
told a speciﬁc story. The authors’ interest is in general patterns and the
use of a large sample of disasters to uncover them. This makes sense,
however, only if all these disasters are realizations from the same under-
lying process. This seems unlikely. Conditioning on the probability of a
war at home will not imply the same set of conditional correlations as
conditioning on a war fought abroad; they imply very different patterns
of correlations. And if the probabilities of these different events vary
across countries and time, the implications of an unconditional approach
are likely to be misleading.
To take an example, and venturing further than I should, it is likely that
in the United States the probability of a war at home (say, the explosion of
an atomic bomb) has decreased with the end of the cold war (conventional
terrorism, including the use of “dirty” bombs, is unlikely to create disasters
on the same scale). But one may argue that the probability of a war abroad
has increased. One may also argue that the probabilities of a hyperinﬂation
or a ﬁnancial crisis have changed substantially over time. If this is the case,
then the unconditional equity premium derived by the authors is likely to
be misleading.
DO WE NEED THE LUCAS-TREE MODEL? Having collected their data, Barro
and Ursúa analyze the data through the lens of a Lucas-tree model, aug-
mented for a small annual probability of disaster à la Thomas Rietz. This
requires them to estimate the probability of a disaster, p, and the size of the
relative consumption disaster, b.
I do not understand why the authors force themselves to look at the data
through this particular straightjacket. Doing so forces them to choose dates
for the start and the end of each disaster, to ignore the length of the disas-
ter, to make assumptions about returns on bills, and so on. The way in
which they map the data onto the inputs of the model is sensible, and given
the mapping constraint, they do the best job that one can, but the results are
sometimes surprising. The choice, for example, of a peak-to-trough frac-
tional decline larger than 10 percent as a criterion for consumption or GDP
disasters seems perfectly reasonable. But it leads, for example, to deﬁning
a consumption disaster for France from 1938 to 1943, even though con-
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inﬂation and very low bill returns occurred from 1945 to 1948, thus after
the authors’ consumption disaster, but before consumption returned to its
prewar level. This may be relevant to the way one thinks about asset pric-
ing.) It also leads to deﬁning a GDP disaster for the United States from
1944 to 1947, which might have come as a surprise to participants at the
time. Given a mechanical rule, one has to accept the discipline of the rule,
and the consequences. The question is whether the rule is needed.
The motivation for using the Lucas-Rietz model until now was twofold.
The ﬁrst was to clarify the potential role of low-probability events in asset
pricing; the model is at just the right level between simplicity and complex-
ity to give nontrivial insights. The second was that researchers lacked even
a representative sample, much less a universe, of disasters to analyze. Thus
one could not be too ambitious in describing correlations during crises, and
the simple p and b approach seemed properly humble and transparent.
The point of this paper is, however, to provide a much larger sample,
indeed the universe of consumption disasters that one can hope to measure.
In this case I see no reason not to go back to asset pricing formulas that
rely only on the ﬁrst-order intertemporal condition of consumers with no
additional assumptions. As is well known, this simpliﬁed condition can be
written, for any asset, as
where M is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption today
and consumption in the next period, R is the gross rate of return on the
asset—stocks, bills, or bonds—over the same period, and E(.) is a condi-
tional expectation.
Given a speciﬁcation of utility and thus of the marginal rate of substitu-
tion, that condition can be used to compute conditional or unconditional
required returns on stocks, bills, and bonds and the implied equity pre-
mium. This computation does not require taking a stand on starting and
ending dates for consumption disasters, nor does it require treating bills as
riskless. It deals naturally with issues of disaster length, which are central
to the computation in the Lucas-Rietz framework. It allows one to explore
how the bursts of inﬂation that often follow consumption disasters are rel-
evant to the equity premium. In short, it seems to simplify the task and to
get around a number of the issues that arise under the current formaliza-
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GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES An important contribution of this
paper by Robert Barro and José Ursúa is the compilation of a comprehen-
sive database of real growth in consumption per capita for twenty-four
countries and in GDP per capita for thirty-six, with data for some countries
dating back to 1870. This database builds upon and greatly expands an ear-
lier one by Angus Maddison on GDP growth and is, in its own right, an
invaluable resource for future research.
1
The paper’s second contribution is to employ this database to revisit and
expound on earlier investigations by Thomas Rietz and by Barro himself
in understanding the role of rare but major economic disasters in the equity
premium and the risk-free rate puzzles.
2 My discussion focuses on the lat-
ter contribution.
The equity premium puzzle, to use the term coined by Rajnish Mehra
and Edward Prescott,
3 originally referred to the inability of the standard
neoclassical economic theory to reconcile the historically large realized
premium of stock market returns over the risk-free interest rate with its low
covariability with aggregate consumption growth.
4 By now it is recognized
that the challenge is actually a dual puzzle of the historical equity premium
being too high (the equity premium puzzle) and the risk-free rate being too
low (the risk-free rate puzzle), relative to the model predictions. The
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of empirical regularities in the prices of capital assets that are at odds with
the predictions of standard economic theory, notably that the returns of
various subclasses of ﬁnancial assets are too large, too variable, and too
predictable.
5 Several generalizations of essential features of the model
have been proposed to mitigate its poor performance.
6
In particular, Rietz entertained the possibility that rare but major eco-
nomic disasters cause a large decline in consumption per capita. In theory,
the prospect of such disasters gives rise to a signiﬁcant equity premium,
while leaving the risk-free rate low because of the precautionary demand
for savings. Rietz calibrated economies that matched both the moments of
the time-series process of consumption growth and the unconditional mean
of the equity premium and the risk-free rate. He pointed out that the size of
the annual (negative) consumption growth at the onset of an economic
disaster needed to resolve the puzzle in his calibrated economies is of the
same order of magnitude as the (negative) consumption growth over the
entire Great Depression. He also pointed out that the model explains only
a small fraction of the equity premium if one calibrates the annual (nega-
tive) consumption growth at the onset of an economic disaster to annual
consumption growth over the Great Depression.
7 Rietz’s model fell by the
wayside until recently revived by Barro.
8
The thesis in that paper and in the present one is that a more careful cal-
ibration of the model implies that major economic disasters explain most
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that one should calibrate the consumption decrease over the ﬁrst year of
the disaster to the measured cumulative consumption decrease from peak
to trough of the disaster period. They motivate this approach with the
observation that the incidence of negative shocks to consumption growth
increases upon the onset of the economic disaster. Although I recognize
the validity of their observation, I explain below why I disagree with their
calibration and conclude that a correctly calibrated model, such as that of
Rietz, explains only a small fraction of the observed premium.
Before I describe the speciﬁcs of the authors’ model and discuss it in
detail, let me explain in broad terms why I disagree with their central argu-
ment. I begin, as they do, with the standard neoclassical economic model,
as adapted in ﬁnance. In a single-good economy, the representative con-
sumer chooses consumption plan {Ct}t=0,1, . . ., subject to a budget con-
straint, and maximizes expected utility  with a constant 
relative risk aversion coefﬁcient γ and a subjective discount factor β.9 Let
R
j
t,t+1 be the total return on the jth asset from time t to time t + 1. If (Ct, Ct+1)
is the optimal consumption plan at times t and t + 1, then the feasible
consumption plan (Ct −δ , Ct+1 +δ Rj
t,t+1) maximizes expected utility with
respect to δ at δ=0, where δ is saving in period t. This variational argu-
ment leads to the standard Euler equation of consumption between times t
and t + 1,
as in the authors’ equation 4.
Suppose that time t signiﬁes the onset of an economic disaster. Then the
Euler equation between times t and t + 1 depends on the conditional distri-
bution of consumption growth at time t, Ct+1/Ct, between times t and t + 1
and on total return, R
j
t,t+1, between times t and t + 1. Note that this deriva-
tion remains valid even if the consumption growth series, Ct+1/Ct, Ct+2/
Ct+1,  ...,  i s  autocorrelated.
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disaster, annual consumption growth over the peak-to-trough period of the
disaster is highly autocorrelated and that one should replace one-year con-
sumption growth, Ct+1/Ct, in the standard Euler equation with the measured
cumulative consumption decrease from peak to trough, for example,
Ct+4/Ct for a four-year decline, as
This is the Euler equation that Barro and Ursúa implicitly apply upon the
onset of an economic disaster. They provide no formal derivation of equa-
tion 2, and I believe that this equation is incorrect. In a technical sense, this
Euler equation concentrates and magniﬁes the effect of an economic disas-
ter and thus generates a much higher premium than equation 1 does (an
observation made earlier by Rietz).
The correct version of the Euler equation with the measured cumula-
tive consumption decrease from peak-to-trough (four-year) consumption
growth, Ct+4/Ct, is
This equation states that the Euler equation on four-year consumption
growth addresses the four-year return.
As I will show later, the authors’ baseline consumption case (the ﬁrst
row in their table 10) says that their model of economic disasters generates
a premium of 0.059 − 0.01, or 4.9 percent, over 3.6 years. However, the
historical equity premium over a holding period of 3.6 years is approxi-
mately 3.6 × 6 percent = 21.6 percent.
10 Thus, the authors’ model of eco-
nomic disasters explains 4.9 ÷ 21.6 ≈ 0.227, or less than a quarter, of the
historical equity premium.
Let me now turn to the authors’ formal model. Each year the economy
is in either a normal state (N) or a disaster state (D). The sequence of states
at the annual frequency is a Markov chain. The transition probability in
one year from N to D is p (and that from N to N is 1 − p); the transition
probability in one year from D to N is π (and that from D to D is 1 −π ).
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N as PN =π /(π+p) and that of being in state D as PD = p/(π+p). The
annual probability of the onset of a disaster is π×p/(π+p), and the
expected length of a disaster is π
−1 years.
In their baseline case, Barro and Ursúa observe that the sample mean
length of disasters is 3.6 years. Therefore, I set π=(3.6)
−1 = 0.278, which
agrees with their value of 0.277 in table 10. They observe 343 disaster
years out of a total of 2,963 years across countries. Therefore, I set the
unconditional probability of a disaster year as PD = p/(π+p) = 343/2,963 =
0.1158, which, combined with π=0.278, gives p = 0.0364. This value of p
is approximately equal to the authors’ value of 0.0363 in table 10. Thus,
the authors and I are in agreement regarding the calibration of the Markov
chain in the baseline case.
11
Note that the Markov chain and its calibration already accommodate the
observation that the incidence of consumption growth shocks is highly
correlated during a disaster: whereas the unconditional probability of a
disaster year is PD = 0.1158, the probability conditional on the previous
year being a disaster year is 1 −π=1 − 0.278 = 0.722. I argue later on that
Barro and Ursúa double-count this correlation.
Barro and Ursúa assume the following process for annual consumption
growth:
where ut+1, υt+1 are i.i.d., ut+1 ∼ N(0, σ2), υt+1 = 0 if t + 1 is a normal year, and
υt+1 = log(1 − b) if t + 1 is a disaster year. If t is a normal year, then the
probability that t + 1 is a normal year is 1 − p, and the probability that it is
a disaster year is p; if t is a disaster year, then the probability that t + 1 is a
normal year is π, and the probability that it is a disaster year is 1 −π . Thus,
Barro and Ursúa model annual consumption growth as a process that is not
i.i.d., contrary to their claim: “However, Barro shows that with i.i.d.
shocks (as in the present model), the ﬁrst-order optimizing conditions gen-
erate asset pricing equations of familiar form.”
Barro and Ursúa set the probability that ut+1 = log(1 − b) equal to p =
0.0363 in the baseline. Recall, however, that p was earlier deﬁned as the
transition probability in one year from N to D. The probability that υt+1 =
log(1 − b) should be set equal to the unconditional probability of a disaster
year, PD = p/(π+p) = 0.1158.
( ) log log , 4 11 1 CC g u tt t t ++ + −= + + υ
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11. Note that this calibration does not account for estimation error and, in particular, the
correlation of economic disasters across countries.
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disaster year, υt+1 = log(1 − b). Barro and Ursúa assume that the peak-to-
trough shock occurs in the ﬁrst year of a disaster. This assumption is not
supported by the data over the two primary consumption disaster periods
in the United States, 1917–21 and 1929–33. Over 1917–21, the arithmetic
annual total real consumption growth, [(Ct+1/Ct) − 1] × 100, is −2.6 per-
cent, −3.7 percent, −4.6 percent, and −6.4 percent in 1917–18, 1918–19,
1919–20, and 1920–21, respectively.
12 The most important feature of these
data is that the consumption decline in the ﬁrst year of the disaster period
is the smallest annual decline over the 1917–21 period and accounts for
only a fraction of the total consumption decline. Likewise, over the period
1929–33 the arithmetic annual total consumption growth, [(Ct+1/Ct) − 1] ×
100, is −6.4 percent, −3.9 percent, −9.5 percent, and −2.8 percent in 1929–
30, 1930–31, 1931–32, and 1932–33, respectively. As before, the con-
sumption decline in the ﬁrst year of the disaster period accounts for only a
fraction of the total consumption decline. Similar observations apply to
data on nondurables consumption. These observations do not support the
authors’ calibration that treats the peak-to-trough consumption decline as
if it occurs in the ﬁrst year of the disaster period.
Given the above observations and the Markovian nature of the authors’
model, I proceed to calibrate the fractional decline in annual consumption
b if the end of the year is a disaster year. The expected cumulative peak-to-
trough consumption ratio is
For this calculation I rely on the authors’ assumption that the shocks (1 − b1),
(1 − b2) ,  ...,  ( 1  − bn) are i.i.d.
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12. In private communication, the authors kindly provided the data for total consump-
tion growth and nondurables consumption growth over 1917–21 and 1929–33. I draw similar
conclusions by using consumption data on nondurables and services from John Campbell’s
website (www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/campbell) and by using consumption data
from Robert Shiller’s website (www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm) that include durables
in the deﬁnition of consumption.
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trough-to-peak consumption ratio is 1 − 0.219 = 0.781. Setting π(1 − b
–
)/
[1 − (1 −π )(1 − b
–
)] = 0.781 and π=0.278, I obtain 1 − b
–
= 0.928. As a
back-of-the-envelope calculation, note that with the sample mean length of
disasters being 3.6 years, the expected cumulative trough-to-peak con-
sumption ratio is roughly (0.928)
3.6 = 0.764, which is very close to 0.781.
Barro and Ursúa assume for convenience that “equity” or the “stock
market” is the claim to the future consumption stream. Effectively, they
assume that the capitalized value of future labor income is either zero 
or included in “equity.” This assumption conveniently allows one to bypass
the need to specify the conditional return distribution on the equity.
Although this assumption is counterfactual, it is a common assumption in
the early literature on the equity premium and I leave it at that.
Barro and Ursúa state the Euler equation of consumption between dates
t and t + 1 for the equity return and the risk-free rate in their equations 6
and 7, respectively. I take the difference of these equations and obtain the
premium as follows:
If b were constant, equation 6 would simplify to r
e − rf =γ σ 2 +
p{b[E(1 − b)
−γ − 1]}. This is the same as equation 8 in the paper. However,
the authors do not assume that b is constant, and therefore their equation 8
is incorrect.
Even after this correction, another correction needs to be made in my
own equation 6. Based on my discussion above, I correct equation 6 by
replacing p with p/(π+p), the unconditional probability of a disaster state
at the end of the year, and state it as follows:
As I argued above, 1 − b should be thought of as the one-year consumption
ratio in disaster years and not as the cumulative trough-to-peak consump-
tion ratio in these years. Since I do not have the moments for E(1 − b)
−γ and
E(1 − b)
1−γ either over one year or over the cumulative trough-to-peak
period, I do a calibration in the special case where b is constant. The point
of this exercise is to demonstrate that the authors’ approach and mine yield
results that differ by an order of magnitude, when in both cases b is treated
as constant. In both cases I set γ=3.5, p = 0.0363, and π=0.278 and sup-
press the term γσ
2, as the authors do.
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tion 7 yields an annual equity premium r
e − r
f = 0.0348. By contrast, when
I set 1 − b = 0.928, which I argued is the correct way to think about the
annual shock in a disaster state, equation 7 yields an annual equity pre-
mium r
e − r
f = 0.0025. Although both numbers are small because I have
suppressed uncertainty about b for reasons of convenience, the point is that
the premium 0.0025 is less than one-tenth of the premium 0.0348. I rec-
ommend that the authors provide the annual moments for E(1 − b)
−γ and
E(1 − b)
1−γ and repeat the above comparison without the assumption that b
is constant.
As I argued above, there is an alternative and intuitive way to make
the same point. I finesse the controversial issue as to whether the entire
shock to consumption occurs in the year of onset of the disaster or is dis-
tributed over all years of the disaster, by choosing the length of one
period in the model to be 3.6 years instead of one year. In this case it
does not matter which year during the disaster period is the year in which
consumption drops. Then the baseline case in the authors’ table 10 says
that their model of economic disasters generates a premium of 0.059 −
0.01, or 4.9 percent, over 3.6 years. However, the historical equity pre-
mium over a holding period of 3.6 years is, as noted above, approxi-
mately 3.6 × 6 = 21.6 percent, which again is less than a quarter of the
historical equity premium.
Barro and Ursúa do not provide empirical evidence to support giving
special status to one year as the length of time over which the entire shock
to consumption occurs upon the onset of a disaster. Had they instead
picked one month as the critical period, the modiﬁed calibration above
would predict a one-month premium of 4.9 percent, which is almost ten
times the historical one-month premium of 
6⁄12 = 0.5 percent.
I have argued that Barro and Ursúa do not deliver a convincingly cali-
brated model of economy-wide disasters that explains a substantial frac-
tion of the historically observed equity premium. The reason is that the
annual drop in consumption during these disasters is too small to explain
the premium, even after allowing for the fact that the incidence of negative
shocks to consumption growth increases upon the onset of an economic
disaster. The authors’ device of attributing the entire peak-to-trough drop
in consumption to the year of onset of the disaster is simply counterfactual
and double-counts the increased incidence of negative shocks to consump-
tion growth after the onset of the disaster. In a recent empirical study,
Christian Julliard and Anisha Ghosh ﬁnd that economy-wide disasters,
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the cross section of asset returns.
13
There is, however, an alternative interpretation of economic disasters,
namely, as periods where the incidence of large negative idiosyncratic
income shocks increases at the household level.
14 These shocks may
largely wash out at the aggregate level and may not even show up in aggre-
gate consumption data. Nevertheless, these shocks potentially play a major
role in the pricing of financial assets through the household Euler equa-
tions of consumption, provided they are persistent and uninsurable. Given
that markets provide grossly incomplete consumption insurance, models that
account for these shocks show promise for understanding the source of the
equity premium and of the premia of subclasses of ﬁnancial assets.
GENERAL DISCUSSION Robert Hall commented on the history of the
equity premium literature, starting with Lars Peter Hansen and Kenneth
Singleton’s 1983 paper on the temporal behavior of asset returns. He sug-
gested that one could measure the progress of this literature by the plausi-
bility of the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion required to match the
equity premium. Papers such as this one tend either to overestimate the rel-
ative risk aversion coefﬁcient or to fail to explain the equity premium. He
suggested that the authors’ relative risk aversion coefﬁcient of 3.5 was
unreasonably high. 
William Brainard noted that international portfolio diversiﬁcation is sub-
stantial and has ﬂuctuated greatly since the late nineteenth century. The
authors’ assumption that economies are closed greatly simpliﬁes the analy-
sis but may bias the results. For example, it presumably overstates the risk
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13. Julliard and Ghosh, “Can Rare Events Explain the Equity Premium Puzzle?” work-
ing paper, London School of Economics, 2008.
14. Such models were suggested by Mehra and Prescott in an early draft of their 1985
paper, “The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” working paper, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1980;
and by N. Gregory Mankiw, “The Equity Premium and the Concentration of Aggregate
Shocks,” Journal of Financial Economics 17, no. 1 (1986): 211–19. George M. Constanti-
nides and Darrell Dufﬁe, “Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumers,” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 104, no. 2 (1996): 219–40, introduced such a model in an intertemporal
economy. Alon Brav, George M. Constantinides, and Christopher C. Geczy, “Asset Pricing
with Heterogeneous Consumers and Limited Participation: Empirical Evidence,” Journal of
Political Economy 110, no. 4 (2002): 793–824, provided empirical support for the model. See
also Tom Krebs, “Testable Implications of Consumption-Based Asset Pricing Models with
Incomplete Markets,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 40, no. 1–2 (2004): 191–206.
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 349faced by a typical investor and therefore understates the degree of risk aver-
sion required to rationalize observed risk premia.
Christopher Sims observed that high rates of risk aversion may not be
needed to explain asset pricing paradoxes. Instead, it is possible that disas-
ters follow different probability distributions. Because these events are so
rare, however, it is difﬁcult to measure this with conﬁdence. The authors’
ﬁgure 1 caps the disaster size at 70 percent, but it is unclear whether the dis-
tribution tapers off slowly toward this maximum or falls off sharply. These
two behaviors have wildly different implications for asset pricing. There-
fore, experimenting with different probability distributions would be useful. 
William Nordhaus cited research on the probability distributions of other
war statistics, such as the number of fatalities, and suggested that consump-
tion shocks might be similarly distributed. He said that these variables seem
to follow Cauchy distributions, which is problematic because standard esti-
mation techniques then do not work: variances and means are inﬁnite.
Nordhaus also noted that the authors assumed that disasters led to perma-
nent level shifts in consumption, and this applied even to cases of large
wars. The authors’ ﬁgures suggested trend reversion following each of the
major wars, so the consumption shock would be overestimated under the
assumption of a permanent shock.
Lawrence Summers pointed out that consumption and asset returns in
many of the countries in this dataset are highly correlated during major cri-
sis periods such as World War II. He questioned the value of including
highly correlated observations, which may not add any more information
than, say, dividing North and South Carolina into separate observations in
a U.S. dataset. 
Summers also wondered whether the Euler equation makes sense dur-
ing wars: consumption is rationed, so the marginal utility of income cannot
be inferred from observed consumption. Similarly, in periods of ﬁnancial
crisis, international capital ﬂows and exchange rate movements can make
it difﬁcult to accurately assess the behavior of asset markets. For example,
during the Mexican ﬁnancial crisis of 1995, the peso collapsed but the
Mexican stock market appeared to rally. The reason was that the stock
market was priced in dollars, and because the peso was falling faster than
stock prices, the dollar value of stocks increased. Stock prices may there-
fore have provided an inaccurate description of what was happening in
Mexican asset markets during this period. David Romer wondered whether
asset returns were measured accurately during periods of hyperinﬂation,
and whether the authors had been successful in dealing with periods of
default. A few observations where the rate of return on government bonds
was close to minus 100 percent might affect the picture dramatically.
350 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008
11302-04_Barro_rev.qxd  9/12/08  1:04 PM  Page 350